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SHOULD THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM IN ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES BE REFORMED
IN THE LIGHT OF SOFTWOOD LUMBER II1?
CHARLEs M. GASTLE OF TiiE ONTARIO BAR*
AND
JFAN-G. CASTEL, Q.C.**
I. INTRODUCTION
The softwood lumber dispute is a good illustration of the operation of
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)' dispute settlement
mechanism in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. It is the
longest-running trade dispute between the United States and Canada,
having lasted eleven years and gone through three distinct stages.
Canada's experience with U.S. trade laws during the dispute had a
profound effect on the negotiation of the FTA, resulting in the adoption
of an original system of dispute settlement.
The recent Softwood Lumber III extraordinary challenge committee
(ECC) report,' which reviewed the U.S. Department of Commerce
International Trade Agency's finding of subsidy, provides an opportunity
to analyze the performance of the binational panel system, particularly
the extraordinary challenge committee procedure. This is the third
extraordinary challenge committee that has been convened, 3 but Soft-
wood Lumber III is the first dispute in which both the binational panel and
* LL.B., Toronto; LL.M., Osgoode; Partner, Shibley Righton, Toronto.
** J.D., Michigan; SJ.D., Harvard; Distinguished Research Professor and Professor of Interna-
tional Trade Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto; Member of Special Group
under Chapter 19 Can-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 1989-94; Panelist on Pure and Alloy Magnesium
from Canada (CVD), USA-92-1904-03.
I. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988, ch. 19, 27
I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter FTA]. Final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations may be
reviewed by a binational panel. In exceptional circumstances panel decisions may be reviewed by a
binational extraordinary challenge committee. Id. arts. 1901, 1904, Annexes 1901.2, 1904.13, at
386-90, 393-395.
2. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01USA, 1994
FTAPD LEXIS II (Binational Review) (Aug. 3, 1994) [hereinafter SoftwoodLumberllI].
3. The other extraordinary challenge committees were" In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork
from Canada, ECC-91-1904-01 USA, 1991 WL 153112, 4 TCT 7037 (June 14, 1991) [hereinafter
Porkfrom Canada] and In re Live Swine from Canada, ECC 93-1904-01 USA, 1993 WL 566371, 5 TCT
8088 (April 8, 1993) [hereinafter Live Swine].
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the extraordinary challenge committee divided along national lines. It is
also the first in which serious allegations of an appearance of bias were
levied against two of the Canadian members of the binational panel.
The first two extraordinary challenge committees and the Canadian
majority in Softwood Lumber III defined a narrow role for the ECC based
upon a standard of review that limited the ECC to determining whether
the binational "panel conscientiously attempted to apply the appropri-
ate law as they understood it."' 4 The ECC was not required to determine
whether the panel applied the relevant law correctly.5 The issue expressly left
open by the first two challenges was whether an error of law alone is sufficient
to constitute a material threat to the integrity of the binational panel process
as required by the standard of review provision of the Free Trade Agree-
ment.6 The Softwood Lumber IHI challenge raised the same issue, as the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Coalition for Fair
Lumber Imports (Coalition) asserted that the binational panel so
misconstrued U.S. law that the integrity of the process was threatened.
The Canadian majority on the committee held that the narrow
threshold had not been met. 7 The U.S. dissent by Judge Malcolm
Wilkey, a former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, contains a strongly worded condemnation of the Softwood Lumber
III binational panel and extraordinary challenge committee majority
determinations, as well as the entire binational panel mechanism.
I submit that the well intentioned system of Extraordinary
Challenge Committees, as a substitute for the standard appel-
late review under United States law, has failed. It has failed both
at the Panel and the Committee levels to apply United States
law, substantively, and most clearly in regard to the United
States standard of review of administrative agency actions. The
system runs the risk, not only of producing egregiously errone-
ous results as in the instant three to two panel decision, but also
of creating a body of law-even though formally without prece-
dential value-which will be divergent from United States law
applied to countries not members of NAFTA.8
Judge Wilkey's dissenting opinion raises a number of issues, the most
important of which is the degree of deference that should be paid by
4. The ECC standard of review is provided in FrA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13), at 388-89.
5. Id.; see also Softwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *20-21.
6. See FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904.13(b), at 389.
7. Soflwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *79-80.
8. Id. at *205.
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the reviewing panel to the administrative agencies. He argues that
virtually absolute deference must be given, unless there has been a "totally
irrational" exercise of discretion. If Judge Wilkey is correct, this raises the
question of whether there is any need for a binational panel mechanism.
In the chapter of the Free Trade Agreement that addresses binational
panel dispute settlement in antidumping and countervailing duty cases,
the standard of review to be applied to U.S. decisions is defined as the
standard set forth in section 516A(b)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930.9
Under this section, the standard of review to be applied by the Court of
International Trade and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is that the
court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion that
is not supported by substantial evidence on the record or otherwise not in
accordance with law. FTA Article 1904(3) requires binational panels to
apply this standard when reviewing a U.S. final determination. 1
0
The first prong-"substantial evidence on the record"-applies to
"factual determinations."" Although the courts often accord deference
to the agency's construction of the evidence, it must be based on "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."' 2 Thus, while an agency has discretion to give a
reasonable interpretation of the evidence, a reviewing body is not
compelled to give absolute deference to such interpretation.
The second prong-"otherwise not in accordance with law"-applies
to issues of law and matters the resolution of which depends more on
underlying policy than on evidentiary considerations. The deference to
be shown by a reviewing body to an agency determination on such
questions depends on the nature of the question at issue. A reviewing
court's role is greater where the legal question does not relate to the
construction of the agency's governing statute. In these circumstances, a
court may overturn an agency determination if it is "incorrect."13
A disturbing undercurrent runs throughout the dissent: the role of
nationality that Judge Wilkey cites as the reason for his view that U.S.
law had been misapplied. One may question his Honor's argument that
the Softwood Lumber III result did turn on the issue of nationality and that
the determination likely would have been different had a U.S. majority
9. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1911, at 391,393.
10. Id. art. 1904(3), at 387.
11. Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
12. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
13. See generally Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
445-46 n.29 (1987); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
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been selected at either the binational panel or extraordinary challenge
committee level.'
4
Nationality played such a role in Judge Wilkey's eyes that he ex-
pressed concern regarding the inclusion of Mexican panelists in the
future.15 If Canadian panelists could completely misunderstand the
process of administrative review in the United States despite Canada's
common law traditions and similar institutions, Mexican panelists
cannot hope to perform adequately due to Mexico's different standards
and civil law institutions.' 6 Actually, the United States should be more
concerned with the exercise of discretion by Mexican administrative
officials in antidumping and countervailing duty disputes commenced in
Mexico against U.S. goods and services than with their expected perfor-
mance on binational panels and extraordinary challenge committees.
The role of nationality takes on more sinister connotations in light of
the allegations of an appearance of bias made against Canadian panel-
ists Hunter and Dearden and the allegation of a "serious conflict of
interest" against Hunter.' 7 These allegations magnify the perception
that the position taken by the Canadian panelists is not based upon
principle. The positions could be taken out of their proper context and
used by U.S. interest groups and congressional opponents to discredit
the binational panel system, thereby increasing pressures for change.
This is unfortunate because a review of the binational panel determina-
tions indicates that no allegations of bias or bad faith were made. This
Article will not deal with the allegations of bias in order to focus upon
what we consider to be the more important issue of the function of the
binational panels and extraordinary challenge committees.
By overstating the role of nationality, Judge Wilkey undermined his
argument regarding the application of the correct standard of review.
There are a number of instances where Judge Wilkey's dissenting
opinion goes far beyond the arguments that were made before the
committee. For instance, there was no argument made relating to the
issue of nationality, and, while Judge Wilkey might suggest that the
"problem" of nationality underlies the entire binational panel process,
he is wholly on his own on this issue. Because Congress expressly decided
to have Canadian panelists participate in the review of final antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations, reasonable differences are bound to
arise--especially due to the standard of "substantial evidence on the record."
14. Prior ECCs were unanimous decisions of Canadian and United States judges.
15. SoftwoodLumber II, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *215.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *68-69.
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Judge Wilkey appears to have magnified the issue of nationality in
order to supply the element that appears to have been missing in the
arguments made in the challenge: the threat to the integrity of the
process. In doing so, his Honor appears to descend into the forum and
become an advocate. In the context of an international dispute settle-
ment mechansim, an element of unfairness may be introduced when
Judge Wilkey criticizes the Canadian members of an international
tribunal for not understanding complex-yet never-argued-aspects of
U.S. law. As a result, his criticism of the Canadian Committee members-
and their ability to comprehend U.S. principles ofjudicial review-must
be taken with a healthy degree of skepticism.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the dissent appears to
have done much to feed U.S. criticisms of the Chapter 19 mechanism.
Congress clearly intends to modify trade laws to ensure that a "proper
measure" of deference be given to the administrative agencies. The
comments ofJudge Wilkey build upon subtle changes made in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 18 provisions regarding the
ECC and incorporate references to strongly worded congressional re-
ports released in November 1993 regarding the implementation of
NAFTA. These reports deal in part with the "misapplication" of U.S.
law in Softwood Lumber III.
One response of the United States has been to introduce amendments
in the GATT 1994'9 implementing legislation specifically directed at
"correcting" countervailing duty laws. The determination of a "counter-
vailable subsidy" requires a finding of specificity and preferentiality in
the bestowal of some grant or advantage to a particular group. Gener-
ally available subsidies are not countervailable. The amendments ex-
pressly reject the sequential factor analysis regarding specificity and the
market distortion test regarding preferentiality, upon which the Sofi-
woodLumber III determination turned. The creation by the United States
of a domestic institution, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dis-
pute Settlement Review Commission, is also designed to control WTO
Dispute Settlement Body or Appellate Body panel reports perceived to
be inimical to U.S. interests.
18. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1994), 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
19. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
(GAT Secretariat 1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND]. Portions of the Final Act
also appear in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994).
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Article 1903(l)(b) of the FTA includes a panel review mechanism of
such amendments for a declaratory opinion as to whether they are
inconsistent with the FTA or GATT or whether they are designed
specifically to overturn a binational panel determination.2 0 It will be
interesting to see if the amendments in the WTO implementing legisla-
tion are subjected to such a mechanism, which to date has never been
used and is unlikely to provide an effective brake on the amendments
because it is not binding. The only remedy is that Canada will be
permitted to adopt the same provisions in its own domestic trade laws,
which would be quite acceptable to the United States.
The United States has taken other steps to ensure that the "correct"
standard of review is applied by future panels and extraordinary chal-
lenge committees. The NAFTA implementing legislation requires the
appointment to the roster and panels of Article 11121 judges, both active
and retired, "whenever possible." Article III judges sit in the Court of
International Trade and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The
United States is thus attempting to use the same category of judges in
both forums, which is one way in which to ensure consistency of
interpretation. It is a clever move because Canadian panelists will likely
defer to U.S. judges with respect to the proper interpretation of the U.S.
standard of review and proper degree of deference that must be paid to
the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commis-
sion.Judge Wilkey is an Article III judge.
Finally, the Coalition could launch Softwood Lumber IV in respect of a
trading period subsequent to that used in Softwood Lumber III, in the hope
that an U.S. majority on either the binational panel or extraordinary
challenge committee would reverse Softwood Lumber III. The Coalition
has recently warned "that the Canadian side must make major changes
to its timber practices quickly or face another investigation that could
lead to border tariffs.",22 The problem of inconsistent results would
20. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1903(1)(b), at 387.
21. Article III judges are those appointed pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution. Extraordinary challenge committees must comprise judges or former judges exclu-
sively. NAFTA, supra note 18, Annex 1904.13(1), at 68.
22. U.S. Fires up Softwood Lumber Dispute: Washington Wants to Reduce Canadian Imports While
Industi, Threatens to Launch New Trade War, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 21, 1995, at B1. The Coalition issued
its warning during binational consultations to which Canada agreed in December 1994, in return
for the abandonment of the Coalition's constitutional challenge of the ECC Softwood Lumber III
determination. In December 1994, the Coalition made clear that it was not renouncing the
possibility of commencing a new complaint. Mr. Singleton, the chairman of the lobby has stated
that ". . . should the consultations ultimately prove unproductive, the coalition will reassess its
strategy, including the possibility of new litigation and recourse to trade remedies." The abandon-
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become manifest if a Softwood Lumber IV reversed the Softwood Lumber III
determination on the same substantive issues.
What are the implications for the binational dispute settlement
mechanism of the Softwood Lumber III result? The response in the United
States, including the legislative amendments, indicates a fundamental
flaw: binational panel determinations can be easily overturned through
a legislative amendment or a new investigation. Critics would point out
that this is the first time that such an amendment has occurred, that no
new investigation has been commenced, and there is no guarantee that
the United States would win Softwood Lumber IV. However, legislative
amendments directed at closing the "loopholes" that permitted Canada
to win SoftwoodLumber III do not bode well for the mechanism, especially
since, so far, this has been one of the most important disputes in which
Canada was involved. The Softwood Lumber dispute also highlights the
awkward compromise that is the FTA/NAFTA mechanism. The Cana-
dian goal had been to eliminate existing antidumping and countervail-
ing duty rules and to negotiate a new set of laws modelled on competi-
tion law principles with a binational tribunal to enforce them. This goal
proved elusive because U.S. trade officials wanted strict limits placed
upon what they considered to be trade distorting practices through
'Canada's improper use of subsidies. As a result, the binational panel
mechanism was introduced as a stop gap measure. There is a need to
control the exercise of the broad discretion granted to administrative
tribunals by the complex web of domestic trade laws established upon
the broad principles included in the GATT. The question is how to do it
effectively.
This Article analyzes the extraordinary challenge committee report,
and particularly the U.S. dissent, due to its importance in summarizing
U.S. complaints regarding the performance of the dispute settlement
mechanism. The implications of the Softwood Lumber III case are also
considered, including the prospects of fundamental reform of the rules
and institutions for the settlement of trade disputes. The Article does
not purport to discuss the merits of the Canadian or U.S. position on the
issues pertaining to subsidies or whether U.S. law is settled in the area of
natural resource-based countervailing duty cases.2 3
ment of the challenge represents a truce'and not a settlement. Trade Talks Face Rough Ride, GLOBE &
MAIL, Dec. 19, 1994, at B 1; see also Ottawa Makes It Official: Softwood Lumber Fight Is Over, GLOBE &
MAIL, Dec. 16, 1994, at B2.
23. To get a full understanding of the case and the arguments made, the authors recommend
that the Briefs filed on the Extraordinary Challenge be reviewed (available from the NAFTA
Secretariats in Ottawa and Washington).
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II. EXTRAODINARY CHALLENGE CoMMITTEE: PRE-SOFTWOOD
The FTA provided that there was to be no right of appeal from a panel
decision to the domestic courts. 24 However, a Party could, within "a
reasonable time," bring an "extraordinary challenge." 25 Three commit-
tee members were appointed from a ten person roster comprised of
judges and former judges of a federal court of the United States or a
court of superior jurisdiction of Canada. Each Party selected one mem-
ber and the third was selected by the two members or, if necessary, by lot
from the roster.26 Before Softwood Lumber III, there had been two
extraordinary challenge committees convened.27 Both challenges were
brought by the United States after significant pressure from interest
groups and Congress. In both cases, the committees, with a majority of
Canadian members, unanimously affirmed the decision of the binational
panel and established a relatively high threshold for a successful appeal
to the ECC.
In the first committee decision, Pork from Canada, the committee
reviewed its role in the binational panel mechanism. It found that the
extraordinary challenge committee was not intended to function as an
appellate court and a panel decision may be reversed only in "extraordi-
nary" circumstances. 28 The mechanism was intended solely as "a safe-
guard Against an impropriety or gross panel error that could threaten
the integrity of the [binational panel review] process." 29 The committee
set out a number of factors indicating the narrowness of ECC review.
First, the committee commented on the limited circumstances under
which a challenge could be brought. 30 Secondly, the committee pointed
out that the text of FTA Article 1904(13) contained "strong, descriptive
terms" such as "gross," "serious," "fundamental," "materially," "mani-
festly," and "threatens," which "highlight the committee's formidable
standard of review."' 3 1 Thirdly, the procedural rules narrowly circum-
scribed the nature of the review by limiting the review to thirty days and
also restricted the panel to three judges or former judges, instead of a
five member panel with expertise in international trade law. Fourthly,
24. F[A, supra note 1, art. 1904(11), at 388.
25. Id. art. 1904(13), at 388-89.
26. Id. Annex 1904.13(1), at 395.
27. Porkfrom Canada, 1991 WL 153112;Live Swine, 1993 WL 566371.
28. Porkfrom Canada, 1991 WL 153112, at *3.
29. Id. at *3 (quoting The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Summary of the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, at 37, (Feb. 1988)).
30. Porkfrom Canada, 1991 WL 153112, at *3-4.
31. Id. at *4.
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only the parties to the agreement could request an extraordinary
challenge. The committee concluded:
In short, the role of an Extraordinary Challenge Committee, as
the name implies and as the FTA provisions and procedural
rules suggest, is to review Binational Panel decisions in only
exceptional circumstances. Only upon evidence of egregious
error that achieves the threshold requirements set forth in FTA
Article 1904.13(a) and (b) may an extraordinary challenge be
maintained.
3 2
The "narrowly-defined" test set forth in Article 1904.13 of the FTA
provided:
Where, within a reasonable time after the panel decision is
issued, a Party alleges that:
(a) (i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross miscon-
duct, bias, or a serious conflict of interest, or other-
wise materially violated the rules of conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental
rule of procedure, or
(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, author-
ity or jurisdiction set forth in this Article, and
(b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has
materially affected the panel's decision and threatens
the integrity of the binational panel review process, that
Party may avail itself of the extraordinary challenge
procedure set out in Annex 1904.13.33
The panel held that the three branches of the test are conjunctive:
Thus, in order to sustain an extraordinary challenge the Com-
mitteefirst must find that a panel or panel member is guilty of
one of the actions set forth in paragraph "a." Second, the
Committee must find that such action "materially affected the
panel's decision." And third, the Committee must determine
that the action "threatens the integrity of the binational panel
review process.
'
"
34
32. Id. at *5.
33. FTA,supra note 1, art. 1904(13), at 388-89.
34. Porkfrom Canada, 1991 'NL 153112, at *4.
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The panel stated that its "only function" was to ascertain whether each
of the three requirements had been established and that evidence of
egregious error achieving the narrow threshold requirements will suf-
fice. 35 The requirements of "materiality" and "threat to the integrity of
the binational panel review process" are important distinguishing char-
acteristics in the extraordinary challenge standard of review. For in-
stance, the committee found that these requirements distinguished the
ECC standard from a similar standard of review under the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States.
36
At the time, the USTR did not find fault with the Pork from Canada
definition of the narrow role of the extraordinary challenge committee.
The USTR argued in his Brief as follows:
The United States does not contend that every erroneous
decision by a binational panel threatens the integrity of the
binational panel system. The extraordinary challenge commit-
tee is not designed to function as a routine appeal procedure.
Rather, it was intended by the Parties as a safeguard for the
binational dispute settlement mechanism. It is to be used only in
rare circumstances, such as in the event of an impropriety or
manifest legal error that could threaten the integrity of the
panel process .... 37
Given the fundamental importance of strict adherence by
FTA panels to their legal charters, however, any substantial
departure by a binational panel from its FTA mandate threatens
to undermine the integrity of the interim panel system, and may
compromise efforts to establish a more permanent decision-
making mechanism. In cases in which a panel has assumed
powers not assigned to it under the FTA or has failed to observe
its duty to apply the domestic law of the importing country, such
behaviour threatens the fundamental tenets of the panel system, and
the basis for the agreement between the parties to that system.
38
35. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at *9 n.4.
37. It is interesting to note that the testimony of Ms. Jean Anderson is cited as authority for
this statement, in the Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-73 (1988).
At the time she was the Chief Counsel for International Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce. In
Sofiwood Lumber III, she represented the Canadian Government and Judge Wilkey relied upon
excerpts of her testimony before various committees.
38. Brief of the United States at 12-13, Porkfrom Canada, ECC-91-1904 USA.
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The extraordinary challenge committee did not decide whether an error of
law would be sufficient to set aside a binational panel decision, leaving the
issue to be determined by future committees. Instead, the committee defined
a "conscientious application" standard in the following manner:
With respect to subparagraph 1904.13(a)(iii), the role of this
Committee is to ensure that the Panel has articulated the
correct test for review and that it has conducted an analysis of
pertinent facts taken from the ITC record in order to apply the
relevant standard of review. The primary role of this Committee
under subparagraph 1904.13(a)(iii) involves the determination
of a failure on the part of the Panel to conform to this standard.
That failure, in the words of subparagraph 1904.13 (a) (iii), must
be "manifest." The Committee is not directed byArticle 1904.13
to review the record of the ITC to determine the adequacy of the
action and decision taken by the Panel. We are neither autho-
rized nor directed to substitute our judgment on the issue of
"substantial evidence" for the judgment of the Panel. We are
required only to satisfy that the appropriate United States law
has been conscientiously applied.
The issue as to jurisdiction of the Committee in the event an
error of law is committed by the Panel in the interpretation or
application of the admittedly applicable United States law was
not raised before the Committee. Therefore, this issue need not
be addressed here. It should be added that no such error of law
that would constitute an excess of jurisdiction is "manifest" in
the reasons for decisions taken by the Panel.39
The extraordinary challenge committee in Live Swine4 0 was asked to
review the binational panel's reversal of finding of countervailability by
the Department of Commerce. The binational panel had rejected
Commerce's finding that the government programs in question were de
facto specific because the actual number of users was small relative to the
total number of potential users. The rejection was made on the basis
that "Commerce's fundamental reliance on the finding of a 'small'
number of beneficiaries constitutes a purely mathematical analysis ...
not in accordance with law."
4 1
39. Porkfrom Canada, 1991 WL 153112, at *8-9.
40. Live Swine, 1993 WL 566371.
41. Brief of the United States at 6, In re Live Swine from Canada, ECC-91-1904-OIUSA
[hereinafter Live Swine Brief].
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The position of the USTR regarding the role of the extraordinary
challenge mechanism had changed from that asserted in argument
before the Pork from Canada committee. Counsel for the USTR argued
that a failure to apply the correct standard of review is sufficient for the
committee to set aside a binational panel's determination:
Proper application of the judicial standard of review of the
importing country is fundamental to the integrity of the bina-
tional panel process. The requirement that panels apply the
correct standard is expressly established at Article 1904.3. Its
inclusion was an essential element in the bargain struck between
the United States and Canada in establishing the process.
Accordingly, given its central importance to the binational panel
process, it is difficult to imagine a case that more clearly presents
a threat to the integrity of the process than one such as this in
which a binational panel has issued a decision fundamentally at
odds with well-established U.S. law and judicial precedent.
... [T] he text of the CFTA and the longstanding views of both
Parties make clear that application of the correct judicial stan-
dard of review is fundamental to the proper functioning of the
binational panel review process. Accordingly, failure to apply
that standard plainly "threatens the integrity" of that review
process and requires that the Majority's decision be overturned
by this Committee.
... The obligation to apply the correct standard of judicial
review is fundamental to the operation of the binational panel
process. Both Parties have recognized its central importance in
maintaining the efficacy of the system.
4 2
The USTR brief in Live Swine contained a detailed argument that the
binational panel had committed errors of law with respect to the issue of
specificity. The argument included an assertion that "the Panel Major-
ity unequivocally established a new obligation under U.S. law: namely,
that in order to make an affirmative determination of specificity,
Commerce must make an affirmative 'finding' with respect to at least
two factors identified in Commerce's proposed regulations.,
43
42. Id. at 12-14.
43. Id. at 11.
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The Live Swine extraordinary challenge committee once again defined
a high threshold for a successful challenge, requiring more than legal
error:
The ECC should address systemic problems and not mere legal
issues that do not threaten the integrity of the FTA's dispute
resolution mechanism itself. A systemic problem arises when-
ever the binational panel process itself is tainted by failure on
the part of a panel or a panelist to follow their mandate under
the FTA.4 4
The Live Swine committee accepted that a misapplication of the U.S. or
Canadian standard of review by the binational panel could result in a
successful challenge. The committee stated:
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") makes
explicit what was implicit in the FTA that if a panel fails to apply
that appropriate standard of review, it manifestly exceeds "its
powers, authority or jurisdiction," the first prong of our three-
part test, FTA Article 1904(a) (iii) .... Neither Party challenged
the proposition that if the Panel failed to apply the proper
standard of review, it had violated prong one of the test.45
The committee also declared that the challenge process "is not intended
to function as a routine appeal' 4 6 and that "the ECC cannot become an
appeal forum for every frustrated participant in the binational panel
process."'4 7 The "ECC should be perceived as a safety valve in those
extraordinary circumstances where a challenge is warranted to main-
tain the integrity of the binational panel process.",48 Rather, the commit-
tee accepted the "conscientious application" standard of review set out
in the Fresh Pork challenge:
During oral argument, Counsel for the Canadian government
argued that it was required that a Panel "expressly refuse" to
apply a standard of review prescribed in applicable domestic law
in order to conclude that the Panel "manifestly exceeded its ...
44. Live Swine, 1993 WL 566371, at *3.
45. Id. at *4.
46. Soflwood Lumber III, 1994 FIAPD LEXIS 11, at *21.
47. Id. at *24.
48. Id. at *21.
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jurisdiction.".. . Express rejection is not required. The appropri-
ate test is whether the Panel accurately articulated the scope of
review and, as the first ECC stated, whether it "has been
conscientiously applied.". . . Although we cannot say here, based
upon the record before us, that the Panel did not conscientiously
apply the appropriate standard of review, that is not to say that
in another case if a panel simply cites the correct standard of
review and the record does not reflect the conscientious applica-
tion of it, that panel would not be manifestly exceeding its
jurisdiction.4 9
The Live Swine ECC thereby articulated a standard of review that left
open a window of opportunity for future committees to take a more
interventionist role. However, the committee did not find that the
threshold had been met in this instance, even though it felt that the
panel may have erred with respect to the conclusions it reached. 50 There
is even a suggestion in a footnote to the text that the panel failed to
distinguish legal issues from factual issues in their determination.5 '
The Live Swine committee determination is important because it
confirms the "conscientious application" standard of review. It also
confirms that a failure to apply the appropriate standard of review can
result in a successful challenge. However, legal errors that do not
threaten the integrity of the binational dispute process will not be
sufficient. A legal error in the determination of specificity will not
necessarily result in a successful challenge, even though the USTR
argued that the "Panel Majority unequivocally established a new obliga-
tion under U.S. law." 52 No threat to the binational panel system was
found even though the USTR argued that "one practical effect of
decisions such as the Majority's in this case would be to establish a
separate body of U.S. subsidies law for Canadian products .... ,53 All of
these issues are material to the Softwood Lumber III dispute which, in
many respects, duplicates the argument made before the Live Swine
extraordinary challenge committee.
49. Live Swine, 1993 WL 56637 1, at *4.
50. Id. at *5.
51. Footnote 8 states: "Panels should take care to distinguish legal issues from factual ones,
particularly where as here they base their decision upon the resolution of such issues."Id at *7 n. 8.
52. Live Swine Brief, supra note 41, at 11.
53. Id. at 18.
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III. NAFTA: CHANGES TO BINATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM
In order to place the Softwood Lumber III extraordinary challenge
committee determination in its proper context, it is important to review
some of the subtle differences between the FTA and the NAFTA dispute
settlement mechanisms. The Live Swine ECC panel report highlights
one of the changes made to the ECC standard of review in the NAFTA,
the clarification being set out in italics:
NAFTA 1904(13) Where, within a reasonable time after the
panel decision is issued, an involved Party alleges that:
(a)...
... (iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers,
authority or jurisdiction set out in this Article,for
example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of
review;
54
A further change is included in NAFTA Annex 1904.13(3) as follows:
Committee decisions shall be binding on the Parties with respect to
the particular matter between the Parties that was-before the panel.
After examination of the legal andfactual analysis underling the findings and
conclusions of the panel's decision in order to determine whether one ofthe grounds
set out in Article 1904(13) has been established, and on finding that one of
those grounds has been established, the committee shall vacate
the original panel decision or remand it to the original panel for
action not inconsistent with the committee's decision; if the
grounds are not established, it shall deny the challenge and,
therefore, the original panel decision shall stand affirmed.5 5
The time period in which the ECC review is to be undertaken has also
been lengthened, with an increase from thirty days under the FTA to
ninety days under NAFTA.56 In its report regarding the implementation
of NAFTA, the House Committee on Ways and Means stated the
following with respect to these changes:
Two additional important changes from U.S.-Canada FTA
procedures for ECCs are found in Annex 1904.13 of the NAFTA.
54. NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1904(13), at 688 (emphasis added).
55. Id. Annex 1904.13(3), at 688 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
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Under the NAFTA, ECCs, if convened, must examine the legal
and factual analysis underlying the findings and conclusions of
the panel's decision. Annex 1904.13 of the NAFTA also triples
the length of time available to the ECC to undertake its review.
The United States sought the changes in Annex 1904.13 based
on its experience under the U.S.-Canada FTA. By expanding the
period of review and requiring ECCs to look at the panel's
underlying legal and factual analysis, the changes to Annex 1904
clarify that ECC's responsibilities do not end with simply ensur-
ing that the panel articulated the correct standard of review.
Rather, ECCs are also to examine whether the panel correctly
analyzed the substantive law and underlying facts.5 7
Further changes are evident in the NAFTA implementing legislation in
the United States. The Joint Senate Committee report states with
respect to the selection of panelists and committee members:
Subsection [402(a) of the implementing legislation] further
provides that the rosters of potential panelists shall be com-
prised to the fullest extent practicable 58 of judges and former
judges and requires the USTR to appoint judges and former
judges to serve on panels and committees convened under
Chapter 19 ....
The Committee strongly believes that judges and former
judges should be encouraged to serve on binational panels....
[T]he Committee is concerned that binational panels consti-
tuted under the CFTA have, in several cases, failed to apply the
appropriate standard of review. The Committee believes that
this problem could be ameliorated to some extent through the
participation of judges and former judges in the panel process.
In addition, the Committee believes that the use of judges and
former judges may avoid potential conflict of interest problems
that may arise when members of the trade bar, trade consul-
tants or other experts in international trade are appointed to
serve on binational panels and committees. The Committee
recognizes that these individuals are sometimes called upon to
make decisions regarding issues that may arise in other cases in
57. NAFTA Implementation Act, H.R. REP. No. 361, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 75-76 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2625-26 [hereinafter House NAFTA Report].
58. NAFTA Annex 1901.2(1) provides: "The roster shall includejudges or formerjudges to the
fullest extent practicable." NAFTA, supra note 18, at 687.
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which they or their firms are participating. It may be difficult to
ensure that panelists fully segregate their client interests from
their responsibilities on binational panels. Again, the Commit-
tee believes that appointing sitting judges to binational panels
could help avoid potential conflicts .... To this end, the Commit-
tee urges the USTR to look not only to sitting Article III judges,
but also to Administrative Law Judges and retired judges who
meet the qualifications set forth in Annex 1901.2. 59
The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary makes clear the
purpose that underlies these changes:
There are several advantages to having judges and former
judges serve as panelists. For example, the participation of
panelists with judicial experience would help to ensure that, in
accordance with the requirement of Article 1904, panels review
determinations of the administering authorities precisely as
would a court of the importing country by applying exclusively
that country's antidumping and countervailing duty law and its
standard of review. In addition, the involvement of judges in the
process would diminish the possibility that panels and courts will
develop distinct bodies of U.S. law.
For these reasons, the United States hopes not only to include
judges and former judges on the roster to the fullest extent
practicable as required by Annex 1901.2, but also to appoint
judges and former judges to individual panels and committees
whenever they are willing and available to serve.6o
The Senate and House reports also dealt directly with the Softwood
Lumber III dispute, indicating that the binational panel was in error in its
application of the standard of review by not providing sufficient defer-
ence to the Department of Commerce. The Joint Committee report of
the Senate states:
The Committee believes, however, that FTA binational panels
have, in several instances, failed to apply the appropriate stan-
dard of review, potentially undermining the integrity of the
binational process.
59. NAFTA Implementation Act, S. REP. No. 189, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Senate NAFTA Report].
60. Id. at 126.
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Specifically, the Committee believes that some binational
panels have not afforded the appropriate deference to U.S.
agency determinations required by the United States Supreme
Court .... Absent a direct conflict with the plain language of the
statute, panels, like the courts for which they substitute, are
restricted to examining whether the agency's view is a permis-
sible construction of the statute. The Committee emphasizes in
this regard that it is the function of the courts, and thus panels,
to determine whether the agency has correctly applied the law,
not to make the ultimate decision that Congress has reserved to
the agency.6 '
The Joint Senate Committee report goes on to deal with the two
substantive grounds upon which the Softwood Lumber III dispute turned.
The application of countervailing duties requires a finding of both
specificity and preferentiality. With respect to specificity, the binational
panel required Commerce to adduce evidence regarding four factors
that have been set out in proposed regulations.6 2 Assuming that the
specificity requirement is met, the preferentiality issue arises. Com-
merce found that "different Canadian provinces sold cutting rights to
timber on publicly-owned lands at 'preferential rates' measured against
the 'benchmark' prices charged in alternate markets." 63 The issue that
arose was whether or not Commerce had to prove that a distortion of
the market process occurred, with Commerce taking the position obvi-
ously that it did not. 64 Commerce refused to consider whether or not
"market distortion" occurred, even though it used this factor as one of
61. Id. at42.
62. Softwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *85-6. These four factors had been
discussed in ChiefJudge Nies's decision of the United States Court of Appeals in PPG Indus., Inc. v.
United States, and they were codified in proposed regulations. 928 F.2d 1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
These factors include:
(i) the extent to which a government acts to limit the availability of a program;
(ii) the number of enterprises, industries, or groups thereof that actually use a program;
(iii) whether there are dominant users of a program, or whether certain enterprises,
industries or groups thereof receive disproportionately large benefits under a program;
and
(iv) the extent to which a government exercises discretion in conferring benefits under a
program.
63. Sofwood Lumber III, FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *11.
64. Id. at *17-18.
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the grounds for finding log export restrictions countervailable.6 5 The
most powerful element of the binational panel decision was its finding
that, once "market distortion" must be considered, Commerce funda-
mentally misunderstood the economic analysis that was submitted on
behalf of Canada. 66 Even before the binational panel in Softwood Lumber
III released its final remand on December 17, 1993, the Senate Commit-
tee asserted that the binational panel had been wrong on both the
sequential factor issue and the market distortion test:
[T]he Committee is concerned that, in several cases, binational
panels have misinterpreted U.S. law and practice in two key
substantive areas of U.S. countervailing duty law-regarding
the so-called "effects test" and regarding the requirement that a
subsidy must be "specific" to an industry. Thus, the Committee
believes it is appropriate to clarify U.S. law and practice in these
two areas, so that these misinterpretations can be corrected.
Economic Effects Test-In [Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada] ... the binational panel misinterpreted U.S. law to
require that, even after the Department of Commerce has
determined that a subsidy has been provided, the Department
must further demonstrate that the subsidy has the effect of
lowering the price or increasing the output of a good before a
duty can be imposed.
Such an "effects" test for subsidies has never been mandated
by the law and is inconsistent with effective enforcement of the
countervailing duty law.
... From a policy perspective, the Committee believes that an
"effects" analysis should not be required ....
Specificity ....
Several recent binational panels [Softwood Lumber III and Live
Swine] have misinterpreted U.S. law and practice to require the
Department to consider and weigh all relevant factors. However,
another binational panel [Magnesium from Canada] correctly con-
cluded that current Department practice is proper on the ques-
tion of specificity. Due to this confusion, the Committee believes
it is appropriate to clarify how U.S. law should be applied.6 7
65. Id. at *8.
66. Id. at*14-15.
67. Senate NAFTA Report, supra note 59, at 42-43.
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The Senate report then goes on to address the issue of the proper
measure of deference to be given to the Department of Commerce and
the International Trade Commission:
It has been, and remains the intent of Congress that the
Department have wide discretion to determine whether specific-
ity exists in any particular case, in light of the requirement of
the countervailing duty law that the Department countervail
fully subsidies that are conferred on particular industries or
group of industries.....
It is the Committee's expectation that, in the future, bina-
tional panels will properly apply U.S. law and the appropriate
standard of review, giving broad deference to the decisions of
both the Department of Commerce and the ITC. If they do not,
the Committee expects the Administration to avail itself of the
extraordinary challenge procedures set forth in Annex 1904.13.
Paragraph 13 of Article 1904 specifically provides that the extraor-
dinary challenge procedure may be invoked where a panel has
manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction by
failing, for example, to apply the appropriate standard of review,
where such action has materially affected the panel's decision
and threatens the integrity of the binational panel process.
Because the central tenet of Chapter 19 is that a panel must
operate precisely as would the court it replaces, the Committee
believes that misapplication of U.S. law in important areas is a
clear threat to the integrity of the Chapter 19 process.
As provided under Annex 1904.13, the Committee believes
that an extraordinary challenge committee should vacate an
original panel decision or remand' it to the original panel for
action not inconsistent with the committee's decision if a biia-
tional panel has based its decision on a material misrepresenta-
tion of U.S. law or has failed to apply the appropriate standard of
review. The Committee believes that the mere fact that a panel
claims to have applied U.S. law and the proper standard of
review is not a sufficient basis for an extraordinary challenge
committee to uphold a panel decision if the committee's serious
inquiry into the matter, as required under Annex 1904.13,
reveals that the panel has not, in fact, properly applied U.S. law
or the standard of review.
68
68. Id. at 43-44.
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It appears that the United States is attempting to enforce more
closely the U.S. standard of review. The Senate Committee was not
reticent in declaring that the binational panel in SoftwoodLumber III was
wrong. The interesting aspect here is that the original panel determina-
tion was issued on May 6, 1993, the committee report was released on
November 2, 1993, and the final binational panel remand was released
on December 17, 1993. The U.S. minority focused in part upon the
majority's affirmation of its earlier position that a market distortion test
was required.69 The minority reversed its earlier position that such a
test was required, indicating that even their concurrence in the May 6,
1993, initial remand was in error and should be reversed. The reason
stated by the minority for this reversal was its view that a new determination
of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals should be interpreted broadly. This
view is found in Daewoo Electronics Co., Ltd. v. International Union of Electronic,
Electrical, Technical, Salaried and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. 70 The U.S.
minority on the panel in Softwood Lumber III-2d Remand commented:
[T]wo struts in Daewoo... are relevant to this Panel's procedure.
The first strut reinforces the posture of deference that United
States administrative law accords to agency review. The second
strut reinforces the posture of deference owed to the methodolo-
gies developed by the agency to implement its statutory man-
date when the statute itself does not indicate them .... Daewoo
explicitly affirms reasonable, simply executed methods as satis-
factory for the fulfillment of U.S. law and explicitly rejects the
need for complex econometric proof .... The Majority implies
that we find that "the burden imposed on the agency by the
economic analysis and the probative value of the result" are
"dispositive." With respect, this misstates our position ....
[T]he factor of an "onerous burden" supplements and refines these
authoritative sources and confirms that it is reasonable to defer to
the agency's simpler, surer, and more rapid methodology .... Daewoo
69. SoftwoodLumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *16.
70. 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals examined the
applicable standard of review in circumstances where Commerce was considering three different
taxes on color television sets as adjustments to the U.S. price in a dumping determination. In its
first determination, Commerce adjusted the U.S. price for all three taxes instead of looking at the
issue whether the taxes were actually passed on to consumers in the Korean market. The CIT
agreed with the Korean appellants and remanded with directions that Commerce should undertake
an econometric study of the Korean market to determine the tax incidence, or "pass through," of
the commodity taxes upon consumers. The Federal Court of Appeals disagreed with the CITs
directions and held that the CIT could not impose its construction of the statute upon the Agency.
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clarifies the standard of review and, in its light, it is clear that
the Panel's May.6, 1993 decision was wrong. Accordingly, in our
view, Daewoo requires us to revise key parts of that decision.7 '
Further,
We believe that the Majority interprets Daewoo far too nar-
rowly. The Majority holds Daewoo to mean that this Panel cannot
dictate how Commerce must find market distortion, implying
that whether Commerce must find market distortion is simply
beyond question. The Majority reduces the implication of Daewoo
to the conclusion that the Panel cannot require Commerce to
prefer one methodology over another in analyzing market distor-
tion. The Majority asserts that "market distortion is a fundamen-
tal assumption of countervailability under the statute," thereby
rendering it untouchable. This begs the question.
Daewoo itself did not deal with how Commerce must analyze
tax incidence but whether it must analyze tax incidence ....
... In light of Daewoo, the Panel should defer to the methodol-
ogy employed by Commerce in its Final Determination.72
The modifications to the binational panel procedure directed at
changing the composition of the panel and committees, along with the
change in wording to the relevant provision, all point to the fact that the
United States is attempting to ensure that the panels will "properly"
interpret U.S. law and defer to the administrative agencies. The inclu-
sion of judges "to the maximum extent practicable" appears to be an
attempt to make the review much more judicial in nature by using
individuals who are most skilled in the principles of administrative
review and to whom the other panel members are likely to defer with
respect to these principles. The intention to maximize the use of Article
III judges should be noted because they are the ones who sit on the
Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.73 A way to ensure uniformity of interpretation would be to have
71. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. USA-92-1904-01, 1993 FTAPD
LEXIS 15, *175-77 (Binational Panel) (Dec. 17, 1993) [hereinafter SoflwoodIII-2d Remand].
72. Id. at *214-16.
73. The present U.S. NAFTA roster has nojudges. It is our understanding that a new roster is
being considered that may include judges if they are available and witling to serve.
The Canadian Statement on Implementation states that:
Canada notes that, while the text of NAFTA makes specific reference to the rosters for
panels being comprised "to the fullest extent practicable" of sitting or retired judges, it
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Article IIIjudges sit on binational panels exclusively. Such a suggestion
could be implemented by appointing judges only as a practice or by
removing the words "to the fullest extent practicable" from NAFTA
Annex 1901.2(1).
Canada does not believe that the changes have materially affected
prior practice:
With respect to the extraordinary challenge provisions of the
NAFTA, its operation will remain the same as that which had
operated under chapter 19 of the FTA. The addition to article
1904.13(a)(iii) of the example: ".... the panel manifestly ex-
ceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set out in the article,
for example, by failing to apply the appropriate standard of
review, . . ." does not expand the scope of an extraordinary
challenge proceeding from what had been negotiated under the
FTA. The example simply makes explicit what was implicit in
the FTA. Where an ECC finds that a panel has failed to apply
the appropriate standard of review, it must then determine
whether that failure materially affected the panel's decision and
whether that failure threatens the integrity of the binational
panel review process. Only if all three of these conditions are
met will the challenge be successful. There have been two
extraordinary challenges brought under the FTA. In both the
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada and the Live Swine IV
cases, the Committees rejected the challenges brought by the
United States. In the Swine IV case, the Committee correctly
characterized the example set out in article 1904.13(a)(iii) of
the NAFTA as making explicit what was implicit under the FTA
and stated that where a panel fails to apply the proper standard
of review, it has violated one prong of a three-prong test for a
successful challenge.
The change of the time frame in Annex 1904.13.2 for the
conduct of an ECC proceeding from "typically within 30 days" to
"within 90 days" reflects reality and practice (i.e., the average
length of time for a proceeding, based on two ECCs under the
does not preclude participation by other qualified experts. It is Canada's intent,
therefore, that binational panels will be made up of experts in international trade law,
including lawyers, non-lawyers and sitting or retired judges, who will be chosen on the
basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and expertise in the trade area.
C. GAZ.,Jan. I, 1994, Part I, at 204.
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FTA, has been approximately 70 days). Annex 1904.13.3 would
make it explicit that an ECC must examine the legal and factual
analysis underlying a binational panel's decision in order to
determine whether one of the grounds for resorting to the
extraordinary challenge procedure has been established. In Cana-
da's view, this was implicit in chapter 19 of the FTA.7 4
IV. SOFTWOOD LUMBER III EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE
The Department of Commerce launched the first Softwood Lumber
countervailing duty investigation in 1983, but dismissed it upon finding
that the "stumpage program" (the cost charged to logging companies
for cutting government-owned stands of timber) was not a specific
subsidy, since it was generally available. 75 Commerce made this decision
on the basis of the "inherent characteristics" test, wherein the limita-
tion on the number of users was due to the inherent characteristics of
the resource and did not arise from any limitation imposed by govern-
ment. 76 Commerce also found that there were too many users in too
wide a range of industries for the program to be considered specific.
7 7
Congress "aggressively asked" Commerce to justify its decision in
congressional hearings that took place soon after, and a number of bills
were proposed to redefine what a countervailable subsidy was in order to
impose duties upon imports of softwood lumber from Canada. 8
Commerce launched Softwood Lumber II in 1986 at the active sugges-
tion of the Reagan Administration. The Administration may have
channelled the Softwood Lumber dispute back before the ITA/ITC as part
of a strategy to defeat the bills that had been proposed:
The executive branch successfully fought the passage of these
bills, arguing that they would, be a violation of U.S. GATT
obligations. Nevertheless, when a softwood lumber case was
reinitiated in 1986, the DOC ruled in a preliminary decision that
the same stumpage program constituted a countervailable sub-
74. Id.
75. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. USA-92-1904-01, 1993 WL
566370, at *90 n.106 (Binational Review) (May 6, 1993) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber III 1st
Remand].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Robert E. Baldwin & Michael 0. Moore, Political Aspects of the Trade Remedy Laws, in DOWN IN
THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAws 267 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan
eds., 1991).
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sidy. Many observers believe that this reversal represents one
instance at least in which the DOC yielded to intense congres-
79
sional pressure.
In Softwood Lumber II, Commerce made a preliminary finding that the
stumpage programs were specific and that provincial governments
exercised discretion in the administration of the programs.8 0 Commerce
found a preliminary duty of 14.5%, "based upon a purported comparison
between revenues from stumpage charges and the provincial govern-
ment's costs of administering their stumpage systems."'" The threat of
unilateral action against Canadian exports was sufficient to convince
Canada to enter into a voluntary Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on December 30, 1986, imposing an export tax of 15%. The
Canadian government then undertook to negotiate changes in provin-
cial stumpage practices.82 The result was a decline in the Canadian
share of the U.S. softwood market from 33% in 1987 to 26.7% in 1990.83
Softwood Lumber III began on September 3, 1991, when Canada notified
the United States that it intended to terminate the MOU as British
Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta (92% of softwood exports) had imple-
mented significant changes to their programs, thereby increasing log
costs.8 4 On October 4, 1991, the USTR ordered a bonding requirement
on Canadian softwood lumber at 15% under the authority of Section
301.85 "Immediately upon termination of the MOU Commerce ...
abandoned the cost/revenue comparison methodology on which [Soft-
wood] Lumber II and the MOU had been based and claimed that stump-
age prices were below market giving a subsidy which was passed to the
lumber producers.",8 6 On October 31, 1991, Commerce formally self-
initiated the third investigation, thus dispensing with the requirement
79. Id.
80. Softwood Lumber 111-1st Remand, 1993 WL 566370, at *3.
81. Soflwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *5-6.
82. Id.; Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act, R.S.C. , ch. 12 (1985 3rd Supp.).
83. ANDERSON & FRIED, SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE UNITED STATES-CANADA
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 6 (1989).
84. Minister of Industry, Science and Technology and Minister for International Trade,
Canada to Terminate Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement, News Release No. 188, September 3,
1991. The Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act ceased to be in force on March 3, 1992. See
C. GAZ., Mar. 25, 1992, Part II, at 1303.
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994). See U.S. Retaliating Against Canada's Lumber Imports, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
5, 1991, at I; 56 Fed. Reg. 50,738 (1991).
86. Softwood Lumber 111, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 1I, at *6.
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of a petition from the affected U.S. industry.87 Canada responded by
requesting a GATT panel to determine whether the Section 301 action
or self-initiation proceedings were justified pursuant to the GATI"
agreements. In December 1991, Commerce expanded its countervailing
duty investigation to include British Columbian export restrictions on
logs, which had been in place for more than 80 years and which never
had been part of either Softwood Lumber I or Softwood Lumber II. Com-
merce announced a preliminary duty finding on March 6, 1992,' of
14.48% and made a final determination on May 15, 1992, of 6.51%.88 The
International Trade Commission in a separate decision found that it
could not "conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence on the
record of no material injury ... and that there is no likelihood that
contrary evidence will be developed in a final investigation." 89 At a rate
of 6.5 1%, duties payable by Canadian exporters amounted to approxi-
mately $200 million a year. Both decisions were appealed to a binational
panel. The decision regarding Commerce's finding of a countervailable
subsidy was released on May 6, 1993. The panel decision with respect to
the ITC finding of injury was released on July 26, 1993. Commerce
released its remand determination on September 17, 1993, and the final
remand by the binational panel was released on December 17, 1993.
A. Argument Before the Committee
The briefs filed by the USTR and the Coalition contained an argu-
ment that an error of law occurred that was sufficient in and of itself to
threaten the integrity of the binational panel process and therebyjustify
a successful challenge. They raised the very issue that had been left
undecided by the Fresh Pork decision: whether an error of law alone can
lead to a successful challenge. In many respects, the argument con-
tained the same elements that had been considered by the Live Swine
committee. One of the issues in Softwood Lumber III was the determina-
tion of specificity and the allegation that the binational panel had
established a new obligation under U.S. law. The alleged "threat to the
integrity of the binational panel process" also involved the allegation
that a separate body of U.S. subsidies law for Canadian products would
emerge if the decision were left to stand.
The argument in Softwood Lumber III discloses that the USTR and the
87. In re Softwood Lumber from Canada, No. USA-92-1904-02, 1993 WL 313374, at *3
(Binational Review) (July 26, 1993) [hereinafter Sofiwood Lumber III-July 26, 1993 Remand].
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Coalition fully accepted the Fresh Pork and Live Swine precedents. For
instance, the argument was based upon an acceptance of the "conscien-
tious application" of the U.S. standard of review, which had been
established as the ECC standard in these decisions. 90 Their acceptance
was confirmed in argument.
The SoftwoodLumber challenge committee was given an opportunity to
add to the definition of what the "conscientious application" standard
entails. Counsel for the USTR argued that the standard involved both a
subjective and an objective element:
Now, according to the ECC in Live Swine, a manifest excess
includes a failure to apply the standard of review of the import-
ing country. Also according to the Swine ECC, the issue is not
just whether the Panel identified the correct standard of review,
but also whether it has conscientiously applied that standard of
review to the facts and circumstances of the case.
Now, dictionaries define the word "conscientious" as careful
and meticulous, and also, governed by one's conscience. Of
course, the Committee can't know whether the Panel followed
its conscience, and we're not asking it to decide that, but the
Committee can look at the decision and try to determine
whether the Panel carefully applied the standard of review.
9 1
Further,
As I indicated in the opening of my remarks, conscientious has
two different meanings, a subjective one and [an] objective one.
Subjective in accordance with one's conscience. Objective, care-
ful, diligent, meticulous. And it's not clear what the Swine ECC
meant by that, but it's basic that it's going to be impossible for
this ECC or anyone to probe the hearts and minds of the
Panelists to see whether they were acting in accordance with
their conscience.
92
Unfortunately, neither the majority nor the minority commented on
this submission.
90. Brief of the United States at 24, In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
No. ECC-94-1904-01USA, [hereinafter USTR Briefi; ECC Record, In re Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-01USA, at 49 [hereinafter ECC Record].
91. ECC Record, supra note 90, at 9.
92. Id. at 35.
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B. Majority ECC Opinion:Justices Hart and Morgan
Similar to the earlier ECC determinations, the Canadian majority
interpreted the standard of review narrowly with a high threshold to be
met by the complainant. Mr.Justice Hart states:
The role of a party requesting an extraordinary challenge com-
mittee is therefore a very difficult one. In this case, not only must
it be shown that a member of the panel was guilty of gross
misconduct, bias, or a serious conflict of interest or otherwise
materially violated the rules of conduct or that the panel mani-
festly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction by failing to
apply the appropriate standard of review but that these actions
had materially affected the panel's decision and also threatened the
integrity of the binational panel review process.93
The ECC is once again held not to be an appellate court reviewing routine
allegations of errors of law. The decision is consistent with Live Swine's
pronouncement that the ECC is not to "become an appeal forum for
every frustrated participant in the binational panel process.",94 The ECC
is meant to determine whether the panel acted within its mandate by
articulating the standard of review and conscientiously attempting to
apply it.
The Extraordinary Challenge Committee function is to deter-
mine whether a panel or panel member violated the three-prong
standard of the extraordinary challenge procedure. It is not an
appellate court nor is it endowed with that court's extensive
jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is restricted to the correction of an
"aberrant panel decision" and any "aberrant behaviour of panel-
ists" that would threaten the integrity of the binational panel
system when such action, is unwarranted .... In short, as the
name implies and as the FTA provisions and procedural rules
suggest, the role of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee is
to review Binational Panel decisions only in exceptional circum-
stances and to vacate those decisions where it is established that
(a) the Panel or member thereof was guilty of the conduct
prescribed in section (I) of Article 1904.13 or that the panel was
in breach of sections (II) or (III) and that such actions materially
93. Sofiwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *24-25.
94. Live Swine, 1993 WL 566371, at *3.
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affected the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the
binational panel system.
95
The extraordinary challenge committee will uphold a binational panel
determination if an appellate court could reach the same conclusion as
did the binational panel. The committee's role is not to determine
whether the law that is applied is absolutely correct or whether the
decision is in strict accord with established United States law. The ECC
does not decide what weight should be given to any decided case.
We are not an appellate court and should not substitute our view
of the evidentiary record for that of the panel nor should we
determine whether the law applied is absolutely correct but
merely whether the panel conscientiously attempted to apply
the appropriate law as they understood it.
9 6
This definition of the "conscientious application" standard by Mr.
Justice Morgan is unfortunate in the sense that he appears to have
defined a subjective standard. He does not provide any analysis that
rejects the USTR submission that an objective element is implicit in the
standard nor does he explain how the binational panel met this part of
the standard, if an objective element indeed exists.
The majority found that the panelists had articulated the proper
standard of review and had conscientiously applied it. 97 The majority
addressed two issues: firstly, the panel's determination of specificity and,
secondly, the requirement that market distortion be found in the
particular circumstances of the softwood lumber market in order to find
preferentiality. 98 Mr. Justice Hart found no error of law with respect to
specificity and no error of law sufficient to constitute a "threat to the
integrity of the binational panel process" on the issue of market
distortion. 99 He also found that it could not be said that an appellate
court could not reach the same conclusion as the binational panel:
It is apparent that the panelists articulated the proper standard
of review and in my opinion the entire panel in its May decision
and the majority in its December decision conscientiously ap-
95. Soflwood Lumber II, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *92-93.
96. Id. at *60-61.
97. Id. at *61.
98. Id. at *44.
99. Id. at *61-62.
1995]
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
plied the appropriate law. There can be differences in view
concerning that law but there is nothing in the record which
appears to me to be an attempt to avoid the standard of review
required by law.' 00
Mr.Justice Hart further wrote,
On the assumption that this recent pronouncement
[Saarstahl] 101 by the CIT represents the law of the United States
it is difficult to say that the panel majority did not apply the
appropriate standard of review when reaching its conclusions.
Because this is a case of first impression I cannot say that an
appellate court in the United States could not reach the same
conclusion as the unanimous panel of May 1993 and the majority
panel of December 1993. The arguments made on both sides had
a solid foundation in court precedents and the amount of
deference extended to the agency was in tune with the novelty of
the exercise.
0 2
In support of the narrowness of the extraordinary challenge committee
standard of review, Mr. Justice Hart points to the uniqueness of the
exercise in which the United States and Canada were engaged:
I would like to point out that in reality the replacement of
court adjudication by a five member panel of experts in interna-
tional trade law may very well reduce the amount of deference to the
Department in the future. When the Court of International Trade
reviews the determinations of Commerce it would be expected
to bow to the expertise within the Department. When the
parties to the FTA agreed to replace that court with this type of
100. Id. at *61.
101. Saarstahl, AG v. United States, Court of International Trade, 858 F. Supp. 187, 193
(1994). Saarstahl rejected Commerce's argument that it was not required to look at subsequent
events once it had determined that a subsidy had been bestowed:
Because the countervailable benefit does not survive the arm's length transaction, there
is no benefit conferred to the purchaser .... The countervailing duty was intended to
offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy
from export subsidies paid by their governments.
Id.
102. Sojlwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *42.
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panel they must have realized and intended that a review of the
actions of Commerce or of the Canadian agency would be more
intense. The panels have been given the right to make a final
determination of the matters in dispute between the two coun-
tries in a relatively short period of time without any judicial
review. Apparently each government felt that this system was
more satisfactory than the one which was replaced.1 °3
The majority opinion, as seen above, turned on the same principles that
represented the underpinnings of the earlier extraordinary challenge
committee determinations. No attempt was made to ensure consistency
with United States law because that is not the object of the exercise,
unless the departure is not only material but also so serious that it
threatens the integrity of the binational panel process. It is possible for an error
of law to threaten the integrity of the process, but presumably not every
error of law could, even if such error might be sufficient to justify
reversal by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States.
The "threat to the system" requirement must have meaning within the
statute, and it seems unusual that the wording would not, in some
manner, create a different appellate process than that in the United
States.
In upholding the binational panel determination, the majority recog-
nized that binational panels have a relatively strong role to play and that
there are limits to the deference that they have to pay to the administra-
tive agencies. Surprisingly, Mr.Justice Hart boldly asserts in the passage
quoted above that the binational panel mechanism "may very well
reduce the amount of deference to the Department [of Commerce] in
the future.' ' 4 It may have been more accurate to say that the deference
to be provided to the agencies was intended to be the same, but the
binational panel system will tolerate decisions showing less deference
than the Court of International Trade or the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals as long as they do not threaten the integrity of the binational
panel system. Any reduction of deference to the administrative agencies
is important for Canada. The effectiveness of the binational panels
depends upon the degree of intrusiveness they have through the mecha-
nism of review. The binational panel mechanism is powerless if the
panels must always defer to the agencies. The Live Swine and Softwood
Lumber binational panel results tend to support the suggestion by
Mr. Justice Hart that a mechanism based upon review by five trade
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at *43.
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experts acts as an invitation to review and analyze more closely the
underlying facts and economic arguments than would be possible before
the Court of International Trade.
C. Minority ECC Opinion:Judge Wilkey
Judge Wilkey's dissent is a strongly worded condemnation of the
binational panel system. It is based upon a rejection of the extraordinary
challenge committee standard of review that had been developed and
applied by the first two ECC panels and the Softwood ECC majority.
Judge Wilkey uses the window of opportunity that was provided by the
Live Swine ECC panel determination to expand the standard of review
dramatically. His Honor rejects any suggestion that the ECC was to
have a limited jurisdiction intended merely to protect the integrity of
the binational panel system that accords deference to the binational
panel interpretation of United States trade law.' 0 5 Judge Wilkey asserts
that the standard of review articulated by Mr. Justice Hart is flawed
when the latter states that the binational panel system ". .. may very
well reduce the amount of deference to the Department in the future"
and that the appellate standard is whether the panel conscientiously
attempted to apply the appropriate law. 10 6 With respect to the question
of deferenceJudge Wilkey states:
One of my colleaguesJustice Hart, has reached the somewhat
astonishing conclusion that this whole substitute appellate re-
view system of Panels and ECCs ".... may very well reduce the
amount of deference which can be paid to the Department in the
future." And that this was "intended." I submit that this totally
violates the fundamental agreed concept that the standard of
appellate review in each country would remain the same.
This will be news to the Commerce Department, that their
agency discretion and deference to their expertise, mandated by
United States statutes and time-honored in practice, has been
diminished exclusively by the votes of the Canadians on the
Panel and on this ECC.
This also is a frank admission that the vigorous denial by the
Canadian parties that two different bodies of U.S. law, in both
substance and procedure, would inevitably emerge from their
proposed standard of appellate review is false. It is clear that a
105. Id. at *213-16.
106. Id. at *213.
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new body of United States law, fathered by Binational Panels
and ECCs under the CFTA (soon NAFTA), will be created, while
long established U.S. law will continue to be applied to imports
from all other countries.'
07
With respect to the standard of a conscientious attempt to apply the
law, Judge Wilkey identifies Mr. Justice Morgan's definition as a purely
subjective standard:
What standard, what test is this? Can the Panel simply say
"We tried. We really tried. We may be wrong on the U.S. law but
we did apply it as we [mis]understood it"? And expect an
Extraordinary Challenge Committee to say "Well done. That's
all we can expect"?
This Standard of Review by an ECC could never possibly have
been intended by the two parties to the CFTA.'0 8
Judge Wilkey then points to the dangers of such a standard:
The failure of the substitute appellate review system in place
of customary United States judicial review of administrative
action confronts us with two dangers. The first is that egre-
giously wrong results will be achieved in individual cases, of
which I believe this is a prime example. The second and most
threatening to the integrity of the whole system is that a lack of
appreciation of the standards of judicial review under U.S. law
will create a dangerous divergence in United States trade law as
applied to relations with Canada and Mexico, parties to the
NAFTA agreements, compared to relations with other nations,
such asJapan, South America and the European Union.' 
09
1. Binational Panel: A Perfect Substitute
Judge Wilkey submits that the standard of judicial review of an
extraordinary challenge committee duplicates the standard of review of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit when reviewing a
Court of International Trade decision but with the slight distinction
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at *215-16.
109. Id. at *216.
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that the ECC proceedings are limited to "important breaches."" The
redefined standard is based upon the proposition that the binational
panel system was intended to be a perfect substitute for U.S. administra-
tive review mechanisms, which would apply U.S. law in a similar fashion
producing similar results:
If this substitute appellate system had not been intended to
achieve similar results in applying U.S. law, the United States
would have never agreed to it. The United States never contem-
plated that United States law would be changed by a binational
body. If the substitute appellate system does not achieve similar
results in applying U.S. law, it may not be long continued."'
Much of the dissenting opinion is dedicated to establishing this proposi-
tion, as it is fundamental to Judge Wilkey's entire criticisnm of the
majority opinion. Once the proposition is accepted, it forms the basis for
the rejection of the majority standard, together with the view that the
binational panel system is threatened and that Canadian panelists will
never understand the process of administrative review in the United
States. Judge Wilkey's first argument in support of the proposition is
that the FTA was intended to preserve and apply domestic U.S. law, as
evidenced by FTA Article 1902 (1) which states:
Each Party reserves the right to apply its antidumping law and
countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of
the other Party. Antidumping law and countervailing duty law
include, as appropriate for each Party, relevant statutes, legisla-
tive history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial
precedents." 1
2
Secondly, his Honor argues that the binational panel system in the FTA
and NAFTA was represented to both governments as applying domestic
laws without change:
[The Free Trade Agreement] was sold to the Congress and to
the Parliament by its sponsors in both countries on the represen-
tation that the domestic law, substantive and procedural, would
110. See id. at *127-35.
111. Id. at * 138 (emphasis added).
112. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1902(1), at 386. See SoflwoodLumber III, 1994 FrADP LEXIS 11, at
"128.
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continue to apply unchanged ... and that, particularly, the
standard of judicial review would be maintained by the two tier
(Panel and ECC) appellate substitute for the domestic courts of
each country.
11 3
He bases this conclusion in part on testimony of the Canadian govern-
ment's lead counsel, Ms. Jean Anderson, who, at the time the Free
Trade Agreement was being reviewed by Congress, was the Chief
Counsel for the International Trade Administration of the Commerce
Department. 114
Thirdly, in order to establish the true intent of Congress, Judge
Wilkey relies heavily on the comments in the congressional reports with
respect to the implementation of NAFTA in November 1993. The
Congressional hearings occurred contemporaneously with the Softwood
Lumber III binational panel review. Thus, Judge Wilkey had to deal with
the question of relevance of contemporaneous legislative pronounce-
ments. He establishes the link by relying upon the passage in the Live
Swine ECC report, which indicated that the wording added to the ECC
three prong test in NAFTA "makes explicit what was implicit in the
FTA, that if a panel fails to apply the appropriate standard of review, it
manifestly exceeds its powers, authority or jurisdiction, the first prong
.... 15 The Senate Report, quoted above, clearly rejects the position of
the binational panel and the majority of the extraordinary challenge
committee in upholding that a market distortion test is required. The
Senate also supports the fundamental premise of Judge Wilkey's argu-
ment that the binational panel system is to act as a perfect substitute:
It is the [Senate] Committee's expectation that, in the future,
binational panels will properly apply U.S. law and the appropri-
ate standard of review, giving broad deference to the decisions of
both the Department of Commerce and the ITC .... [E]xtraor-
113. Softwood Lumber III, 1994 FTADP LEXIS 11, at * 135.
114. It has been suggested that Canada's retention of Ms. Anderson was a tactical error,
allowingJudge Wilkey to quote the extracts from her testimony in 1988 to discredit the Canadian
position in Softwood Lumber III. We do not share this view. The briefs that were filed on all three
challenges quoted Ms. Anderson's testimony for different purposes. For instance, the USTR quoted
Ms. Anderson in 1991 on the Fresh Pork Challenge as authority for the proposition that the
Challenge procedure was relatively narrow and not meant to redress every error of law. The
retention of Ms. Anderson was justified due to the importance of the dispute and her role in the
negotiation and "legislative history" of the mechanism.
115. Softwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *135 (quoting Live Swine, 1993 WL
566371).
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dinary challenge procedures may be invoked where a panel has
manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction by
failing, for example, to apply the appropriate standard of review,
where such action has materially affected the panel's decision
and threatens the integrity of the binational panel process.
Because the central tenet of Chapter 19 is that a panel must operate
precisely as would the court it replaces, the Committee believes that
misapplication of U.S. law in important areas is a clear threat to
the integrity of the Chapter 19 process.' 16
The House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means also
comments upon the Softwood Lumber III binational panel determination
of May 6, 1993:
The decisions of a few binational panels convened under the
U.S.-Canada FTA have underscored the importance of the
NAFTA's emphasis on the proper application of the judicial
standard of review ....
... One case also involved a question of whether the Depart-
ment of Commerce must measure the price and output effects of
a subsidy before countervailing that subsidy. In this regard, the
Administration argued that U.S. law, including the decisions of
U.S. courts, provides that once the Department of Commerce
has found that a subsidy has been provided, it does not have to
show that the subsidy affected the price or output of the product.
In these circumstances, the United States could seek recourse
to the extraordinary challenge procedure. If that procedure
were not successful in correcting the misapplication of law,
Article 1902 describes notification and consultation require-
ments attendant to each NAFTA party's rights to change or
modify its law. It is the Committee's understanding that the
Administration would carefully adhere to these procedures in
supporting legislation to correct the problem. 1
7
In this passage, the Committee on Ways and Means rejects the bina-
tional panel determination, indicates that the purpose of the ECC is to
correct "the problem," and then provides the clear remedy if the ECC
fails to do so: "legislation to correct the problem."
116. Id. at *191-92 (quoting Senate NAFTA Report, supra note 59, at 43-44) (emphasis
added).
117. Sofiwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at * 195-97 (quoting House NAFTA Report,
supra note 57, at 75).
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Fourthly, Judge Wilkey analyzes the threshold, or three prong-test,
for extraordinary challenge committee review, in order to establish its
similarity to the U.S. appellate process. He argues that the first of these
requirements (that the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority,
or jurisdiction set forth), "is nothing more or less than a shortened
version of the two principal elements of the judicial review standard of
the [U.S.] Administrative Procedure Act."'' 8 He does distinguish be-
tween the U.S. standard of review and the ECC standard, suggesting
that the second and third prongs of the ECC test, "materially affect [ing]
a panel's decision" and "threaten[ing] the integrity of the Binational
Panel review process," make the ECC standard "somewhat different"
from the Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit standard." 9 He defines the
difference in an interesting manner, stating that these two prongs
... smacks [sic] of the standards which the Supreme Court
employs in granting certiorari, i.e., the Supreme Court only grants
certiorari when there is at stake the interpretation or operation of an
important substantive law or an important violation of judicial
procedure, such as due process under the criminial law.'
20
Certiorari may be granted where a decision has been rendered by a
United States court of appeals or a state court of last resort in conflict
with another decision rendered by those courts.' 2 1 It also may be
118. Softwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at * 130-31 .Judge Wilkey states that the FTA
wording has been "directly derived from the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946," which
provides:
The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case [involving adjudication on
the record]
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). Note the difference in the standard. The ECC requires that the panel
"manifestly exceeded" where (c) above requires only a determination "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction."
119. SoftwoodLumber III, supra note 2, 1994 fTAPD LEXIS at *133.
120. Id. at *133-34.
121. SuP. CT. R. 10.1; seeJOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTONAL LAW 29 n.2
(1991).
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granted where the guidance of the Supreme Court is needed on an
important question of federal law or where the departure from the
accepted and usual course calls for supervision of the Supreme Court.'2 2
It is apparently designed to ensure that federal laws are interpreted in a
consistent manner so that conflicts can be resolved.Judge Wilkey asserts
that supervision is called for by the ECC because the panel system has
strayed so far from the "substitute scheme for judicial review" process
that it was meant to be.12 3 IfJudge Wilkey's certiorari analogy is correct,
the extraordinary challenge committee will become a regular court of
appeal having as its primary function the prevention of inconsistent
interpretations of domestic trade laws among binational panels and
between the case law emanating from NAFTA and the case law emanat-
ing from the traditional route of appellate review in the United States.
2. ECC: De Novo Review
Judge Wilkey's redefined standard of review duplicates that of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit standard used in reviewing
administrative decisions. He accepts the definition of that standard as
having been correctly set out in the following cases. In PPG Industries, Inc.
v. United States, the standard was defined as:
To determine whether the Court of International Trade cor-
rectly applied that standard in reaching its decision, this court
must apply anew the statute's express standard of review to the
agency's determination. Therefore we must affirm the Court of
International Trade unless we conclude that the ITA's determi-
nation is not supported by substantial evidence or is otherwise
not in accordance with law.'
24
The standard of review was described in Daewoo Electronics v. International
Union in the following terms:
On review of this issue, like the trial court, we look to see whether
substantial evidence supports the decision of the ITA on this issue. 1
2 5
122. SUP. CT. R. 10.1 (a); see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 121, at 29 n.2.
123. SofiwoodLumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *183.
124. 978 F.2d 1232, 1236 (Fed.Cir. 1992) (citing Atlantic Sugar, Ltd v. United States, 744 F.2d
1556, 1559 (Fed.Cir. 1984) [hereinafter PPG V], quoted in Sofiwood Lumber III, 1994 FTADP LEXIS
11, at *162. For the standard of "substantial evidence," see notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text.
125. 6 F.3d 1511, 1520 (Fed.Cir. 1993), quoted in Sofwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at
* 162-63.
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In Judge Wilkey's opinion, the ECC's task is to apply this standard of
review:
We are the second tier of review, as is the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit has defined its role very clearly .... We look both
at the Panel's rationale to see how they did their job, applying
U.S. standards of judicial review.., and to how the Commerce
Department did its job on Redetermination, applying the same
statutory standard as the CIT and the Panel is supposed to, as
laid down by the Federal Circuit in PPG V and Daewoo.' 
26
According to Judge Wilkey, the Softwood Lumber ECC was required to
determine first whether Commerce complied with the binational panel's
instructions in its remand on May 6, 1993. The remand directed
Commerce to analyze all four factors set forth in PPG Industries v. United
States'2 7 when determining the issue of specificity and a market distor-
tion test for preferentiality. 2 8 If Commerce failed to do so, the Softwood
Lumber ECC still had to determine whether the binational panel was
incorrect in its instructions when it mandated that Commerce under-
take these analyses. The basis upon which this determination is made is
whether the "methodology and policy [prescribed by the panel was]
flatly in excess of 'its powers, authority and jurisdiction' under long
established United States standards for review of agency actions."'
' 29
Judge Wilkey states further:
Our role is not to decide the correct methodology or policy for
Commerce, either in the past or in the future. Our role is to
decide whether ITA correctly decided this case, following the
directions of the Panel on the Remand.1
3 0
Judge Wilkey further writes,
When Congress specifies a methodology in a statute, the
agency implementing the statute must comply with that method-
ology, and it is incumbent on the court engaged in administra-
tive review to assure itself that Congress' intentions were ful-
filled and to check that the methodology was followed. When
126. Sofiwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *170 (emphasis added).
127. 929F.2d 156,.
128. Soflwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 1I, at "170.
129. Id. at *171.
130. Id.
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Congress does not specify methodology, it is understood that it is
instructing and empowering the implementing agency to devise
and apply what it deems an appropriate methodology. A court
engaged in administrative review may not superimpose its own
methodology... 131
Judge Wilkey reinforces the degree of deference to the Department of
Commerce which he characterizes as being the "master of antidumping
law." ' 32 The binational panel must determine whether the administra-
tive agency has contravened express wording in the statute. If it has not,
the binational panel must affirm the administrative agency's determina-
tion unless the agency has engaged in a totally irrational exercise of
discretion.133
In other words, when there is a gap in the statute it is the
agency, not a reviewing court, which is authorized by Congress
to fill it. In our case, it is the ITA, not the Binational Panel, which
is authorized to say how many factors it will consider on specificity,
and whether a finding of market distortion is necessary. The statute
is silent. The panel majority usurped the function of the ITA. 13 4
Judge Wilkey's redefinition of the standard of review is notable
because it makes the ECC a regular appellate level with a traditional
standard of review that is required to produce the same results as the
U.S. appellate system. It is no longer functioning as a purely ad hoc
tribunal to determine issues on a case by case basis with its determina-
tions having no status as binding precedents. Whereas the majority
standard of review focused upon the binational panel and whether it
conscientiously applied the correct standard, the minority standard
refocuses the inquiry and requires the ECC to engage in a de novo
review of the administrative agency determination. 13 5 The majority
131. Id. at *179-80.
132. Id. at *173 (quotingDaewoo, 6 F.3d at 1516).
133. Id.
134. Id. at *168-69.
135. In responding to the majority finding that an ECC "should not substitute our view of the
evidentiary record for that of the panel,"Judge Wilkey states:
Wrong focus. Our task is to find out if the Panel substituted its view of the evidence for
that of the ITA, and if so, to set the Panel Decision aside and affirm the agency.
Id. at *215.
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standard did not require the ECC to ensure that the binational panel
decision was in strict accord with U.S. law or was absolutely correct,
while the minority standard is premised on the correct interpretation
and application of U.S. law. The majority standard defers to the
binational panel with respect to the interpretation and weighing of any
decided case, whereas the minority standard requires the ECC itself to
interpret and weigh the case law.
3. Application of the Standard
Judge Wilkey finds that both the binational panel and the majority of
the extraordinary challenge committee have misapplied the appropriate
U.S. standard of review used by the Court of International Trade and
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Softwood Lumber III
binational panel did not defer to the administrative agency in the
manner required under U.S. law. Commerce adequately responded to
the directions by the binational panel to apply the four factors from PPG
V and market distortion and, in any event, the directions by the
binational panel to consider these issues was "flatly in excess of 'its
powers, authority and jurisdiction' under long established United States
standards for review of agency actions."' 136 His Honor points to the fact
that there has been no breach of the statute:
The statement above, that the Commerce Redetermination
findings and conclusions were in conformity with and were in no
way violative of the statute and normal administrative proce-
dure, highlights a significant-perhaps decisive-fact in evaluat-
ing the Panel majority opinion: there is not a word in any statute
which Commerce is accused of violating. There is no administra-
tive action here which is "precluded by statute." To anyone who
has had even a casual introduction to United States administra-
tive law, this is a clear signal that only a totally irrational
exercise by the agency of the discretion entrusted to it by
Congress (extremely broad when trade law is concerned, as the
Federal Circuit has held) would justify setting aside its action. 1
37
Judge Wilkey finds that Commerce made the case for the choice of its
marginal cost theory much stronger than the panel majority had for its
136. Id. at *171.
137. Id. at *172-73,
1995]
LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
rent theory. As a result, he believes that the panel had simply substi-
tuted its decision for that of Commerce.
Basically, the Panel opinion attempts to redo, to reevaluate
the evidence, to redetermine the technical issues before the
administrative agency. The Panel places its own interpretation
and makes its own evaluation of the weight of the evidence. In
addition, the Panel insists upon its own methodology, thus violating
the principles that where there is a gap in the statute, because the
Congress has not prescribed precisely the methodology to be
used, this is confided to the Agency's expertise and discretion. 138
Wilkey further writes,
Confronted with a comparatively new economic situation to
be addressed, it is the ITA of the Commerce Department-not
the courts (or the substitute Panel)-to whom Congress has
given discretion to formulate policy and methodology adequate
to the circumstance .... Unless the Panel majority or my
colleagues can show that Commerce acted contrary to a specific
provision of the governing statute-and neither has even pretended
to assert this-Commerce's Redetermination must prevail.'
39
Judge Wilkey's comments in this regard may go too far. It is apparent
that certain panels have shown less than the appropriate deference and
have been inclined to substitute their own views for those of the
agencies. This is balanced somewhat by the recognition that neither the
Court of International Trade nor the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit have been completely consistent in this regard. Whenever a
reviewing body is involved in determining whether an agency has acted
reasonably, it is difficult to draw a fine line between what is a reasonable
or unreasonable statutory interpretation in a particular set of circum-
stances. The concept of what constitutes "substantial evidence on the
record" is similarly subject to interpretation. NeverthelessJudge Wilkey
does not mince words in commenting upon the intrinsic merit of the
majority of the binational panel:
In summary, I believe that this Binational Panel Majority opin-
ion may violate more principles of appellate review of agency
138. Id. at "174.
139. Id. at *175.
[Vol. 26
REFORM NAFTA?: SOFTWOOD LUMBER III
action than any opinion by a reviewing body which I have ever
read. 1
4 0
4. Threat to the Binational Panel System
Judge Wilkey finds that the misapplication of U.S. law represents a
threat to the dispute settlement system. The majority interpretation
could not have been intended by the parties to the FTA since it was
expressly agreed that U.S. law would be applied. 4 ' As a result, the
credibility of the binational panel system is undercut by the panel
determinations amounting to aberrations when compared with U.S.
jurisprudence. His Honor submits that the practical effect of this
misapplication is that a body of law will emerge for disputes determined
pursuant to the FTA/NAFTA dispute settlement provisions, parallel
and distinct from that applied to cases that are subject to the regular
appellate procedure in the United States. 142
He also points to the risk of the development of an inconsistent body
of law even among cases determined according to the FTA and NAFTA
provisions.143 The most graphic illustration of this risk of inconsistency
is evident when comparing the treatment of the sequential factor
analysis in Softwood Lumber III to that in Pure Alloy Magnesium from
Canada. 1
44
Apart from the issue of inconsistency, Judge Wilkey submits that the
Softwood Lumber III result is an aberration because of the majority's
failure to apply, or even to heed, the precise instructions of Congress,
which in itself will discredit the entire binational panel system:
Nonacceptance by this Extraordinary Challenge Committee
of the unusually strong, precise, and specific language of these
Reports would produce a dangerous adverse reaction in the
Senate and the House, imperilling the whole substitute system
of appellate review by the binational panels and the Extraordi-
nary Challenge Committees .... The next Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Committee will be bound by the Senate and House view of
the meaning of the language in NAFTA as part of its concurrent
contemporary legislative history. If this ECC does not agree with
140. Id. at *177-78.
141. See id. at *220-23.
142. Id. at *216.
143. Id.
144. In re Pure And Alloy Magnesium From Canada, No. USA-92-1904-03, 1993 FTAPD
LEXIS 7 (Binational Panel) (Aug. 16, 1993).
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this interpretation, our decision will be an anomaly, an aberrant
decision in the jurisprudence of review of administrative agency
action. 145
Judge Wilkey identifies one problem with the binational panel system
as the lack of training of panelists in the principles of U.S. administra-
tive review. 4 6 The same would be true with respect to panels involving
Canadian cases whose majority are U.S. experts in trade law. Judge
Wilkey asserts that the problem is that the binational panelists are
selected for their expertise in international trade law or economics and
without regard to training in the principles of administrative review.
Inevitably, the panelists will interfere with the proper functioning of the
administrative agencies, will not give them proper deference, and will
continue to substitute their determination for that of the agencies.
147
The propensity of the binational panels and committees to interfere
with administrative agencies gives rise to Judge Wilkey's concern that
the structure of the two-tier appellate review system has been frustrated
as a result of the majority interpretation of the role of the extraordinary
challenge committee. The Softwood Lumber ECC majority held that
committees are required to defer to the binational panel interpretation
of the principles of U.S. administrative review, the exact area in which
they have no experience or expertise. In a sense, the ECC is held hostage
to a panel that is incapable, according to Judge Wilkey, of properly
interpreting its role and complying with the fundamental requirement
of deference to agency action. This represents a material threat to the
dispute settlement system because extraordinary challenge committees,
Judge Wilkey would argue, are intended to be the second tier safeguard
to ensure that the proper standard of review is applied. The retired
judges who constitute the roster from which ECC members are chosen
are expected to be experienced in the principles of administrative review
and, therefore, in a position to check the enthusiasm of the binational
panelists in substituting their decision for that of the administrative
agencies. The importance of the subtle changes in the NAFTA imple-
menting legislation requiring the use of Article III judges to the fullest
extent practicable to serve as panelists now becomes evident. The
United States will try to ensure that the proper standard of review is
applied.
145. Sofiwood Lumber III, 1994 FTAPD II, at *187-88.
146. Id. at *220.
147. Id. at *212-20.
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Judge Wilkey asserts that the majority has frustrated the extraordi-
nary challenge committee in its role as a safeguard:'
My two colleagues have quoted the Live Swine ECC Decision to
this effect:
The ECC should be perceived as a safety valve in those
extraordinary circumstances where a challenge is war-
ranted to maintain the integrity of the binational panel
process.
Given the obvious errors on the merits in our Binational Panel
3-2 Decision and the unfortunate violations of the Code of
Conduct, I fear that my colleagues, by this Decision, have tied
down the safety valve. 1
48
5. Issue of Nationality
The most disconcerting aspect ofJudge Wilkey's dissent is the difficult
issue of nationality reflected in the split along national lines at both the
binational panel and ECC levels. Judge Wilkey argues that the Cana-
dian binational panelists and ECC majority simply do not have the
training in the principles of U.S. administrative review that would
qualify them to participate in the review of U.S. agency determinations:
The point is that since an Extraordinary Challenge Commit-
tee replaces in the hierarchy a Court of Appeals composed of
generalists on substantive matters but experts on judicial review
of administrative agency action, and since it was specified that
an ECC should be composed of former judges, there is no way for
Canadian members of these ECCs to have become immersed in
the standards of judicial review of agency action in the United
States. Canadian administrative law is different. Canadian re-
view standards are different, and Canadian members necessarily
do not have the same familiarity with U.S. standards of review
that U.S. members do. And yet, it is U.S. law that must be
applied here. 1
49
Judge Wilkey's criticism of the lack of understanding by Canadians of
the U.S. legal principles is replete throughout the dissent. For instance,
148. Id. at *223.
149. Id. at *209-10.
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Canadians do not understand the role of legislative history in the United
States,15 0 do not understand the role of concurrent pronouncements by
Congress,' 5 ' do not understand the principles upon which U.S. prece-
dents should be weighed,152 and completely misunderstand the degree
of deference that must be accorded to the administrative agencies under
U.S. law. 153 Judge Wilkey concludes that the Canadians involved on the
binational panel and the extraordinary challenge committee simply do
not understand the "principles of judicial review of administrative
agency action under United States law."'
' 54
However, Judge Wilkey feels compelled to comment that he does not
believe that the Canadian extraordinary challenge committee members
were biased:
I do not think that any Canadian members of this or previous
ECCs have arrived with any particular animosity against the
U.S. Commerce Department, and I certainly do not suggest in
150. "Putting it frankly, bluntly and perhaps impolitely, the basic problem on accepting these
Reports in this case is that the English Courts accept no legislative history at all and the Canadians
follow closely in their footsteps." Id. at * 181.
151. Judge Wilkey states:
My view is that to ignore the clearly expressed views of seventy-five members of the
United States Senate and the House Ways and Means Committee (speaking for eight
other Committees), expressed at the time it was repassing virtually the identical
language of the CFTA in the NAFITA legislation, is not only to misinterpret United
States law but to imperil the whole binational review scheme. My colleagues treat the
Senate and House views as of no consequence ....
My position is that any United States court wmould feel compelled to accept the views of
the seventy-five members of the Senate Joint Committees and the House Ways and
Means Committee as they spoke to the language of both CFTA and NAVFIA. Hence, my
colleagues refusal to accept this legislative history may be good Canadian law but it is
violative of their obligation to apply United States law in this case. To ignore these two
extraordinarily powerful Congressional Reports may not be "unjudicial" by Canadian
Standards, but it may be highly injudicious.
Id. at *204-05 (emphasis added).
152. Indeed, the entire second Annex tojudge Wilkey's determination is a detailed analysis as
to how the Canadian panelists, counsel and ECC members misunderstood and misapplied U.S. case
law with respect to Saarstahl, PPG, and other cases. Id. Annex 2, at *247.
153. This is most clearly seen in Judge Wilkey's discussion of Justice Hart's "astonishing
conclusion that this whole substitute appellate review-system ofPanels and ECCs '. . . may very well
reduce the amount of deference which can be paid to the Department in the future.' And, that this
was 'intended.' "Id. at *214.
154. Id. at *211.
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the slightest any bad faith on the part of my Canadian col-
leagues-indeed, they have been most assiduous in striving to
understand and discuss rationally U.S. law-but it is a fact that
out of six votes cast on the three ECC Committees, not one of
the Canadian votes has been in support of a United States
Commerce Department decision. The same has been true at the
Panel level in the three cases which have gone to Extraordinary
Challenge Committees. And in the instant case, the total vote to
sustain the Department of Commerce on the issues which are in
litigation here has been two Americans on the Panel and the one
American on the Committee.
155
Nevertheless,Judge Wilkey attributes the failure of the binational panel
system to the issue of nationality in terms that bring into question the
integrity of all of the Canadian panelists and committee members:
On the question as to whether United States law was accu-
rately applied by the Panel majority, the delicate matter of the
split along U.S./Canadian lines assumes some importance. The
two Americans in very strong language voted to sustain the
Commerce Department's Redetermination as being in accordance
with United States law, particularly after the Federal Circuit in
Daewoo illuminated (and mandated) their path; the three Canadi-
ans purported not to understand the clear (to me) application of Daewoo to
this case: Question: if you were a corporate chief executive
seeking an opinion on United States law on which to rely, would
you prefer to receive it from three Canadian or two American
lawyers. And if you did get it from a foreign law firm,what would
your board of directors say? This illustrates that the problem
here is not one of good faith, but of competence and experience
in the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction.' 5 6
By the use of the words "purported not to understand," Judge Wilkey
challenges the integrity of all the Canadians who were involved on both
levels of review because the panel majority interpretation of the Daewoo
decision was accepted by Mr.Justice Hart, 1 57 by implication, and by Mr.
Justice Morgan explicitly. 158
155. Id. at *210-11.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *37-42, *54-55.
158. Id. at *97-100.
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Mr.Justice Hart responded to both the issue of nationality andJudge
Wilkey's argument that the binational panel and ECC did not properly
defer to Commerce:
It is unfortunate that the decision in this matter has not been
unanimous because there is always a chance that it will be
interpreted as a decision based on national interest when the
two Canadian members of the Committee form a majority and
the American member files a dissent. We are however all judges
of long experience and since the issue before us is one of first
impression a sincere difference of opinion should not be unex-
pected.
I have had the opportunity to read the dissenting opinion of
my American colleague and it presents very well his concerns.
He worries that not enough deference is paid to the Commerce
Department as he believes it must be under United States law.
In my opinion, however, he is demanding almost absolute defer-
ence leaving almost no breathing space for a reviewing tribunal.
If this is the correct law to apply then there is no need for a
binational panel under the FTA.'5 9
If one accepts the proposition by Judge Wilkey that deference must be
paid by the panels and the committees to the Department of Com-
merce, then what was the point of substituting the panel system for the
Canadian and U.S. normal appellate tribunals? Perhaps this was done to
placate Canadian public opinion opposed to the FTA. If, on the other
hand, the panels and committees are not to be hemmed in by Commerce
decisions, then Canada would have overcome the perception that U.S.
trade remedies are enforced by Commerce subject to political pressure.
Canadian argument on the challenge identified some of the reasons for
Canada's negotiation of the panel mechanism. These included the fact
that five experts would hear the dispute instead of a single judge of the
Court of International Trade, who is shackled by a heavy docket, and
that the procedure would be quicker.
V. IS THE WILKEY INDICTMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE
COMMITTEE PROCEDURE JUSTIFIED?
Judge Wilkey's dissenting opinion is important, due to the response it
has fueled in the United States but also due to its timing when the
159. Id. at *80.
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WTO implementing legislation was before Congress. The question
arises whether his indictment of the binational panel process, particu-
larly the extraordinary challenge committee procedure, is warranted
and fair.
His Honor has placed emphasis on the degree of deference required
pursuant to U.S. law regarding judicial review of agency determinations
and also upon the hitherto subtle changes in NAFTA that provide a basis
for his argument. The modifications to the ECC standard of review'
60
confirm that a failure by the binational panel to apply the appropriate
standard of review may be sufficient to overturn the panel determina-
tion and that the ECC is required to undertake an examination of the
legal and factual analysis underlying the findings and conclusions of the
panel's decision. NAFTA also has provided a period of ninety days in
which the ECC is to undertake this analysis. This is three times the
period that had been allowed to the FTA ECC mechanism. These
changes would not be necessary if the ECC were simply to determine
whether misconduct had occurred equivalent to bribery of a panelist.
The Live Swine extraordinary challenge committee specifically recog-
nized that the NAFTA modifications created an opportunity for the
ECCs to become more interventionist. The Congressional reports con-
firm the intention behind these modifications. They must be taken
seriously, irrespective of whether Judge Wilkey has been somewhat
adventurous in relying upon congressional pronouncements as to the
meaning of legislation made in the midst of a binational panel review.
The intention of the United States to use Article IIIjudges to influence
the manner in which the U.S. standard of review is applied also confirms
U.S. resolve to control better the binational panel mechanism and the
application of the U.S. standard ofjudicial review.
Judge Wilkey's analysis regarding the interpretation of the ECC
standard of review is based upon the modifications to the relevant
wording in NAFTA. It appears that the ECC standard of review has been
broadened. However, the ECC standard continues to require a high
threshold. Thus, a finding that "a panel manifestly exceeded its powers,
authority orjurisdiction ... for example by failing to apply the appropri-
ate standard of review" must still be accompanied by a finding that the
failure has "materially affected the panel's decision and threatens the
integrity of the binational panel review process." This requirement does
distinguish the extraordinary challenge standard from a regular appel-
late standard of review. It appears to be different from the circum-
stances in which certiorari will be granted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
160. See supra Part II.
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The extraordinary challenge committees in the future will have to
resolve the tension in the wording and the degree to which the amend-
ments give them a more intrusive right to review binational panel
determinations and move it closer to a regular appellate standard.
Judge Wilkey's indictment of the mechanism goes far beyond the argu-
ments made before the ECC, thereby discrediting the most controversial
aspects of the dissent. He does so seemingly in order' to supply the missing
element that the alleged errors of law represent a threat to the binational
panel system. He criticizes the committee majority for three failures:
Regrettably, we have the action of this ECC and the two
opinions of my colleagues explaining that action. To my mind
those opinions reveal another failure to appreciate and apply
United States law. Specifically:
1. The failure to appreciate that the two-tier substitute
system of review is designed to replace the U.S. judicial
review system manned byjudges holding life tenure ....
And that an ECC manned by judges dispossessed of all
power is no substitute at all ....
2. The failure to apply the Federal Circuit's highly
relevant and therefore mandatory holding in Daewoo to
this case ....
3. The failure to consider all the legislative history, the
highly specific and relevant Reports of the Senate and
House extraordinary committees, dealing with the legis-
lation in identical language of both 1988 and 1993. I have
read that Canadian Courts would not consider this, but I
know that United States court would feel compelled to
weigh the words of both these Committee Reports.
Thus is United States law ignored by the majority decision of this
ECC. 161
A review of the briefs filed by the USTR and the Coalition and of the
transcripts from the two days of hearings indicates that only one
reference can be found to the proposition that the binational panel
system was meant to "operate precisely as would the court it replaces,"
and it is included in the Coalition's brief.' 62 No oral argument was made
161. SoflwoodLumber III, 1994 FrAPD LEXIS 11, at *218-219.
162. The systematic nature of the Majority's rewrite of U.S. law violates the FTA's directive
that the binational panels are not to make their own law. "Because the central tenet of Chapter 19
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in respect of this proposition, with even Counsel for the Coalition
stating that an ECC is not an appellate court and that its job is slightly
different because the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit deter-
mines whether the Commerce Department did its job properly whereas
the ECC's focus is upon the binational panel. 163 The USTR and Coali-
tion accepted Fresh Pork and Live Swine and the "conscientious applica-
tion" standard that had been set out in those precedents.Judge Wilkey
is wholly on his own when he sets out his detailed comparison between
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the extraordinary
challenge committee that he uses to criticize the majority for not
"appreciating the two tier system" and applying the same standard of
review as that of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The
concept that the distinguishing characteristic of a "threat to the bina-
tional panel system" is equivalent to certiorari was never mentioned in
argument. At no time did Judge Wilkey put the question to Canadian
Counsel, notwithstanding the fact that the Canadian Brief squarely
addressed the issue that the ordinary grounds for an appeal to the
Federal Circuit were beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee.16 4 He
is that a panel must operate precisely as would the court it replaces, the Committee ... believes
that the misapplication of U.S. law in important areas is a clear threat to the integrity of the
Chapter 19 process." The Majority's decision creates conflicting law for subsidized Canadian
imports and subsidized imports from other countries. Indeed, the binational panels themselves
have issued conflicting opinions with respect to Canadian imports. Having negotiated to preserve
its own laws, the United States cannot accept a back-door attempt to circumvent them. Brief in
Support of Reversing the Binational Panel's Majority Decision on Remand at 81-82, In Re Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-OIUSA.
163. The ECC Record provides a window into this debate:
CHAIRMAN WILKEY: [T~he question, like the question before the Appellate Court
in this city, would be did they conscientiously apply the law?
MR. RAGOSTA: I agree with that, Judge Wilkey, although I'd make one distinction,
which is this Committee does not-it isn't an Appellate Court. In an Appellate Court,
the Federal Circuit actually asked the question of whether the Commerce Department
did its job, and it looks at the Court of International Trade. Your job is slightly different.
It's very close, but it's different, and you've correctly stated it.
Your job is to determine whether the Panel [did its job]. You are the third of the
process, you are to control the second part of the process. Was the Panel doing its job?
ECC Record, supra note 90, at 48-49.
164. Count Two of the Request for the Challenge "asserts that the Panel misread U.S. cases,
statutes and regulations, and thereby committed legal error in ruling that market distortion is an
element of a countervailable subsidy that may not be irrebuttably presumed .... This offers no
more than the ordinary grounds for an appeal to the Federal Circuit, and is beyond the jurisdiction
of this Committee." Joint Brief in Opposition to the Request for an Extraordinary Challenge
Committee at 42, In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, N. ECC-94-1904-O IUSA.
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then criticized the Canadian Committee members for not accepting and
applying his advocacy of the Federal Circuit/certiorari analogy even
though it was unsupported by the arguments before the Committee.
Judge Wilkey's dissent went well beyond the arguments made, and there
is questionable foundation for his criticism of the Canadian Committee
in this regard.
It is clear that Canadian Counsel and trade officials would have
responded to Judge Wilkey's interpretation of the function and role of
the binational dispute settlement mechansim had they been given the
opportunity to do so. Canadian trade officials criticize Judge Wilkey's
Federal Circuit/certiorari analysis on the ground that the binational
panel is designed to replace both the Court of International Trade and
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The extraordinary challenge
committee, on the other hand, is intended to be a completely new,
innovative procedure limited to exceptional circumstances when the
binational panel has gone astray.
The third criticism relating to legislative history also was not argued
before the committee. The USTR and the Coalition did cite the congres-
sional reports that were released in November 1993 but made no
argument that they were important as legislative history and offered no
precedents or academic authorities to support the view that they should
be accorded weight even though they represented contemporaneous
statements. The only argument made with respect to the weight to be
accorded to the reports was by Canadian Counsel, who indicated that
the reference to the reports confirmed the desperation of the appli-
cants. 165 Judge Wilkey did not respond to Counsel's submission, giving
no opportunity for a response to the potential importance of the reports.
With respect to the requirement of a "threat to the integrity of the
process," the role that Judge Wilkey gives to nationality is also a factor
that was not advanced in either written or oral argument. The USTR
argued only that the serious threat is such an important element that
the failure to apply the standard is sufficient:
The Panel's decision constitutes a serious threat to the integ-
rity of the binational panel process. As noted above, application
of the standard of the review is the bedrock element of the deal
struck between the Parties establishing the binational panel
165. ECC Record, supra note 90, at 102. Although it is appropriate and proper for a court to
refer to legislative history contemporaneous with the passage of a law, ex post facto observations by a
subsequent Congress may represent an attempt to "rewrite" history and thus have little if any
probative value in any effort to correctly discern the intent of the Congress that passed the law in
question.
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system. Thus, a panel's failure to put this standard into practice
is, per se, an aberrant decision that constitutes a threat to that
process. Three circumstances of this particular proceeding mag-
nify this threat to the process to an intolerable level.
First, as described above, the manner by which the Panel
failed to apply the standard of review caused it to reach findings
that, in essence, created new substantive countervailing duty law
and new obligations on the investigating authority. Like the
standard of review, each Party's retention of its respective
substantive law was fundamental to the FTA deal.
Second, the Panel's failure occurred on issues that are central
to countervailing duty law in the United States. Specificity is an
issue that must be resolved in virtually every single CVD investi-
gation. Similarly, the issue of whether the statute requires
Commerce to find that a program has an output or price effect
goes to the core of the CVD law. Contrary to the suggestion of
the Majority that it was finding only a narrow exception to the
normal subsidy rules in the natural resource context, the Panel's
conclusion lends itself to application to nearly every CVD inves-
tigation. It will always be possible to raise a claim (on its face not
frivolous) that the particular program at issue has no significant
price or output effects-indeed, as described above Commerce
has faced many such claims already. According to the majority's
reasoning, Commerce would be required to examine and make
findings on such claims, contrary to what is contained in U.S.
law.
Third, in terms of the amount of cross-border trade in the
product at issue, the case is many times larger than any previous
case reviewed by an FTA binational panel. Not surprisingly, the
case is by far the most closely watched binational panel proceed-
ing ever. The Parties have recently carried over and extended
the FTA binational panel process to the NAFTA. If a Panel's
manifest failures are permitted to stand in a case such as this, it
cannot but seriously weaken the prospects for the functioning of
that process in the future.'
6 6
This is the entire written argument on the issue of a "threat to the
integrity of the process." The brief of the Coalition is somewhat more
developed, arguing that the decision creates conflicting law for subsi-
dized Canadian imports and subsidized imports from other countries.
166. USTR Brief, supra note 90, at 112-13.
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There was not even a hint from Judge Wilkey during the oral argument
that he considered Canadians incapable of comprehending U.S. prin-
ciples of appellate review of agency action. His comments regarding the
supposed national bias of Canadian panelists is disingenuous. For
instance, he argues that "it is a fact that out of the six votes cast on the
three ECC Committees, not one of the Canadian votes has been in
support of a United States Commerce Department decision."' 6 7 He
forgets to mention that the two U.S. judges who sat on the Live Swine
and Fresh Pork challenges concurred in the result and the narrow
definition of the role of the challenge process. A review of the binational
panels that have been convened to date to review final determinations of
the Department of Commerce or the International Trade Agency
confirms that there has been a remarkable degree of unanimity in the
panel results. 68 Softwood Lumber III is the only decision that has split
along national lines at either the binational panel or ECC levels.
Canadian trade officials argue that a trend of one is no trend at all and
that Judge Wilkey's dissent must be viewed as an aberration, at least for
169
now.
Judge Wilkey's comments regarding nationality are essential to his
finding that a threat exists to the integrity of the binational panel
process. Canadian Counsel argued that the alleged divergence between
the law regarding Canadian imports and other imports could not
represent a threat. Firstly, the binational panel decisions have no force
as precedents and, secondly, any divergence would be transitory because
167. SofJwoodLumber III, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11, at *211.
168. A review of the composition and decisions of some 57 FTA panels to date does not appear
to support Judge Wilkey. Of the 19 FTA panel cases involving Canadian determinations, 14 have
been completed. Of those 14, 6 were terminated by the parties, and 6 of the 8 panels that issued
rulings made unanimous decisions. Half of the 6 unanimous decisions were by panels with a
Canadian majority composition, and half were by panels with an U.S. majority composition. The
Canadian majority unanimous decisions resulted in 2 remands to the Canadian agency and one
affirmation of a Canadian decision, and so did the 3 U.S. majority unanimous decisions. Of 32 FTA
panel cases involving U.S. determinations, 23 have been completed. Of those, 7 were terminated by
the parties, and 12 of the 16 panel decisions that resulted were unanimous. Half of the 12
unanimous decisions were by Canadian majority panels, and the other half were by U.S. majority
panels. All of the Canadian majority unanimous decisions resulted in remands to the domestic U.S.
agency, while 3 of the U.S. majority unanimous panels resulted in remands and 3 others resulted in
affirmations of the original decision. Of the 16 completed panel rulings on U.S. determinations, 13
remanded the original determination to the U.S. agency, yet 10 of the 13 remands were unanimous.
169. Comments of Debra Steger, General Counsel, Canadian Import Trade Tribunal, Trade
War and Peace: Panels and Committees under the FTA and NAFTA, Canadian Bar Association of
Ontario, (Oct. 19, 1994) (Chateau Laurier Hotel, Ottawa).
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the binational panels would be required to follow any future Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals precedent inconsistent with the binational
panel decisions. Judge Wilkey falls back on the issue of nationality to
reject the argument:
That assumes that the future Binational Panels and ECCs do a
more accurate job in interpreting U.S. law than has been done in
this case. With an increasing body of erroneous CFTA or NAFTA
law, correction is increasingly unlikely to happen in the substi-
tute system. It is only if we can get out of the system that a
correction will be likely to be made.' 
70
It seems to be an astounding statement to say that Canadians will never
understand and correctly apply U.S. law. According to this view, no
correcting mechanism exists, and the binational panel system should be
rejected. 7 ' The ECC, however, was never designed to eliminate incon-
sistencies between panel determinations, such inconsistencies being
somewhat refreshing in light of the straight-jacketed approach of a
Court of International Trade that is extremely reluctant to overturn an
earlier decision of another Court of International Trade judge. In
Softwood Lumber III, the issue concerning the Circuit Court decision in
Daewoo was not whether it bound the panel but rather what was decided
by the court.
Judge Wilkey's comments regarding nationality appear to represent
the real threat to the integrity of the binational panel process. Also, it is
difficult to imagine that the U.S. panelists were not aware of the
congressional reports that had just been released, even though, surpris-
ingly, no mention was made of them in the December 1993 remand, at
which time the panelists reversed their position. The U.S. panel minor-
ity cited the Daewoo precedent as the reason for the reversal of its
position, but it is generally conceded that Daewoo simply restated U.S.
principles of appellate review. During the oral argument, Judge Wilkey
suggested that Daewoo "woke up" the U.S. minority on the panel. With
respect to the failure of the U.S. minority to mention the congressional
reports, he states in the dissenting opinion that:
Apparently these Reports were not called to the attention of the
Panel, they are not discussed, although they certainly would
170. Sofiwood Lumber III, 1994 FIAPD LEXIS 11, at *218.
171. In Canada, Supreme Court judges decide cases involving the civil law or the common law.
By analogy, a panelist could easily school herself or himself in the legal system of another country.
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have had an impact on the Panel and been mentioned at least by
the dissenters had the Panel become aware of them.' 
72
We are of the opinion that what woke up the U.S. minority were the
congressional reports, not Daewoo. It is hard to believe that two experts
in international trade law would not have followed the debate regarding
the implementation of the NAFTA, or that the Coalition would not have
made the minority aware of these congressional reports. The failure to
refer to them in the December remand may be due to the minority's
uncertainty with respect to the status of contemporaneous legal pro-
nouncements. No attempt was made by the USTR or the Coalition
before the ECC to give weight to the reports, although they did cite
them. It is only Judge Wilkey who boldly pronounces that they must be
given significant weight and does the legal research upon which he
attempts to prove his point. It is unfortunate that Canadian Counsel
had no opportunity to respond to the weight to be accorded to these
reports. As a result, Daewoo may not have been as important a factor as
the influence upon the minority of congressional reports expressly
telling the U.S. panelists that they were wrong. In fact, the inclusion of
Canadians on the panel may have acted as an important safeguard for
the process.
VI. LIKELY RESPONSE IN THE UNITED STATES
The most important response has been the inclusion in the WTO
implementing legislation, dated September 26, 1994, of specific provi-
sions amending U.S. law to reflect the U.S. minority's interpretation of
the appropriate trade law. With respect to specificity, the amendments
reject the requirement asserted by the Canadian majority in Softwood
LumberIII that all four factors be considered before a positive finding can
be made. The Statement on Administrative Action declares-that:
Section 771(5A)(D)(iii) lists the factors to be examined with
respect to de facto specificity. These factors, found in Article
2.1(c) of the Subsidies Agreement, and corresponding to the
factors analyzed by Commerce under existing practice, are: (1)
the number of enterprises, industries or groups thereof which
actually use a subsidy; (2) predominant use of a subsidy by an
enterprise, industry, or group; (3) the receipt of disproportion-
ately large amounts of a subsidy by an enterprise, industry, or
172. SofiwoodLumber III, 1994 FIAPD LEXIS 11, at *181.
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group; and (4) the manner in which the authority providing a subsidy
had exercised discretion in its decision to grant the subsidy.
The Administration intends that Commerce seek and con-
sider information relevant to all of these factors. However, given
the purpose of the specificity test as a screening mechanism, the
weight accorded to particular factors will vary from case to case.
For example, where the number of enterprises or industries
using a subsidy is not large, the first factor alone would justify a
finding of specificity, because the absurd results envisioned by
Carlisle would not be threatened if specificity were found. On the
other hand, where the number of users of a subsidy is very large,
the predominant use and disproportionality factors would have
to be assessed. Because the weight accorded to the individual de
facto specificity factors is likely to differ from case to case, clause
(iii) makes clear that Commerce shall find defacto specificity ifone
or more of the factors exist. 173
The Statement on Administrative Action also deals with the issue of
preferentiality and the Canadian insistence of the majority upon "mar-
ket distortion" being found:
Section 771(5)(C) provides that in determining whether a sub-
sidy exists, Commerce is not required to consider the effect of
the subsidy. In Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada USA-
92-1904-02, a three-member majority ruled that in order to find
certain government practices to be subsidies, Commerce must
determine that the practice has an effect on the price or output
of the merchandise under investigation. In so ruling, the major-
ity misinterpreted the holding in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United
States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986), which was limited to the
reasonable proposition that the CVD law cannot be applied to
imports from nonmarket economy countries. Although this panel
decision would not be binding precedent in future cases, the
Administration wants to make clear its view that the new definition of
subsidy does not require that Commerce consider or analyze the effect (including
whether there is any effect at all) of a government action on the price or output of
the class or kind of merchandise under its investigation or review. 174
173. United States Statement of Administrative Action at 261, Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub L. No. 103-465 (Dec. 8, 1994) (emphasis added) (on file with Law and Policy in International
Business). In Canada, see World Trade Organization Implementation Act, Bill C 57, as adopted by the
House of Commons on Nov. 30, 1994, S.C. 1994, ch.47, amending s.2(7.4) of Special Import Measures
Act, R.S.C. 1985 ch. s-15, as to the same effect.
174. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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This indicates one major weakness of the binational panel mechanism in
that there is no effective restriction upon the legislative amendments
directed at overturning binational panel determinations. Of course, an
amendment itself will not overturn a binational panel. However, the
nature of antidumping and countervailing duty law is such that the
complaints are commenced in respect of a particular defined period of
time. The Coalition can rely on the simple expedient of filing a com-
plaint regarding a subsequent period and hope that the result is
overturned by legislative amendments or possibly by the occurrence of a
U.S. majority on either the binational panel or the ECC.
Both the FTA and NAFTA include a mechanism intended to restrict
the adoption of legislative amendments having the effect of overturning
binational panel determinations, but it may not be effective. It will be
instructive to see if the present amendments will be submitted to this
mechanism. Article 1902(2) of the FTA and NAFTA provides that each
party reserves the right to change or modify its laws upon notification
and consultation. 175 Should the consultations not prove successful, a
review mechanism was included in Article 1903 that allows the conven-
ing of a panel for a declaratory opinion as to whether, inter alia:
[S]uch amendment has the function and effect of overturning a
prior decision of a panel made pursuant to [the Free Trade
Agreement dispute settlement system] and does not conform to
the provisions of subparagraph (d) (i) or (d) (ii) of paragraph 2 of
Article 1902.176
The panel report is not binding and only requires the parties to begin
consultations immediately to achieve a "mutually satisfactory solution"
to the matter within ninety days of the issuance of the final declaratory
opinion.177 The following remedy is available if the responding party proceeds
to make an amendment against the recommendation of the panel:
If remedial legislation is-not enacted within nine months from
the end of the 90-day consultation period referred to in subpara-
graph (a) and no other agreement has been reached, the Party
that requested the panel may:
i) take comparable legislative or equivalent executive
action; or
175. See FTA,supra note 1, art. 1902(2), at 386; NAFTA,supra note 18, art. 1902(2), at 682.
176. FTA,supra note 1, art. 1903(I)(b), at 386;see also NAFTA,supra note 18, art. 1903(1)(b), at
682.
177. FTA,supra note 1, art. 1903(3)(a), at 387; NAFTA,supra note 18, art. 1903(3)(a), at 682.
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ii) terminate the agreement upon 60-day written notice
to the other party.
178
These provisions have been considered to represent a significant achieve-
ment that amounts to a potential brake on increases in protectionism.
Such a review of statutory amendments is particulary impor-
tant as it will reduce the probability that general increases in protec-
tionism will affect the two countries. In other words, if either country
wishes to increase its level of protectionism, its legislation will be held
up until the panel's decision. Hence, those drafting legislation will be
more likely to include exemptions for the other member of the FTA.
Further, unless the other country is the particular target for the
amendments, an exemption will more or less automatically be made
because the entire FTA could be threatened.
179
However, it seems to us that the argument that legislators in the United
States would be concerned with reciprocal legislative action being taken
or that the FTA or NAFTA would be put at risk is not persuasive. The
United States would probably welcome Canadian action amending the
Special Import Measures Act' 80 along the lines of the U.S. legislation. The
FTA/NAFTA legislative review mechanism, therefore, subjects trade
legislation to scrutiny but does not effectively control it. Any amend-
ment to trade legislation can be made, even if it has the effect of
overturning a prior binational panel decision under Chapter 19 of the
FTA or NAFTA. Therefore, there is no question that the United States
can respond effectively to the SoftwoodLumber III determination.
VII. REFORM OF THE NAFTA DISPUTE SETI'LEMENT MECHANISM:
OPTIONS
A. General Remarks
Should the present mechanism be eliminated or reformed in the light
ofJudge Wilkey's dissenting opinion so soon after NAFTA was enacted?
The SoftwoodLumberIII dispute highlights the awkward compromise that
is the FTA/NAFTA dispute settlement system. There is a need to
178. FI'A,supra note 1, art. 1903(3)(b), at 387;see also NAFTA, supra note 18, art. 1903(3)(b), at
682-83.
179. A.M. Apuzzo & W.A. Kerr, International Arbitration: The Dispute Settlement Procedures Chosen
for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 5J. INT'L ARB. 7, 11 (1988).
180. SIMA, 1984, ch.25, s. 1, as amended; see also World Trade Organization Implementation
Act, supra note 173 (adding s.2(7.4) to SIMA).
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control the exercise of discretion by the administrative agencies under
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, regulations, and admin-
istrative practices in Canada and in the United States. So far it has
proven impossible to negotiate a new set of substantive rules that would
place the mechanism on a more rational footing. The FTA binational
panel system was a political expedient, ostensibly meant to respond to
the Canadian perception that the Court of International Trade and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have been too deferential
to the administrative agencies. Judge Wilkey would argue that the
deference shown to the administrative agencies reflects the proper
application of U.S. law. Actually, one aspect of the mechanism chosen
was to allow a greater concentration of trade expertise to scrutinize final
administrative determinations at a faster pace and not to rewrite or
redefine U.S. or Canadian trade laws.
The dispute settlement system included in NAFTA cannot control
effectively the exercise of discretion by U.S. administrative agencies due
to the narrow standard of judicial review to be applied. Therefore, it is
difficult to ensure that domestic trade laws are applied in a neutral
fashion. The weakness of the NAFTA mechanism also results from the
fact that Congress can overturn a panel result, even in circumstances in
which the binational panel was correct in its application of both the
standard of review and U.S. trade law. The limits of the mechanism are
that (a) Congress can simply change the law; and (b) the domestic
industry in the United States can file sequential complaints, either
before or after the amendment has passed through Congress. And there
is nothing that Canada can do except duplicate the amendment, thereby
"stepping up" its own joint trade law system to a new level of abstrac-
tion. One important reform would be to introduce more effective
restrictions to the NAFTA mechanism crafted to restrict legislative or
regulatory amendments designed specifically to overturn binational
panel determinations.
Canadians should be careful in asserting that the system is just fine as
it is, because there may be an U.S. panel majority in the next softwood
dispute, and Canadians may need a more powerful ECC to have at least
an opportunity to reverse the result. Canada has argued that the
binational panel system need not promote consistency, as it is only an ad
hoc arbitral process that is meant to get a result quickly and is not
binding in respect of any other dispute. This does not seem to be an
adequate answer. Inconsistency between panel determinations brings
the entire process into disrepute. Canada's goal in devising a dispute
settlement system should be to influence administrative practices.
Canada can only do so if the system has some measure of credibility with
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the administrative agencies. This may be an elusive goal with respect to
the relationship between the binational panels and the Department of
Commerce, as evidenced by the Live Swine and Softwood Lumber III
binational panels. Strengthening the powers of review of the extraordi-
nary challenge committees is one way of addressing this issue. The
current perception in the United States is that there is no effective
review of binational panel determinations. The system might have more
credibility if the second tier conducted a more thorough review and
came to the same conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
B. Change In Trade Laws
How should the dispute settlement system be changed? The best way
would be to change the economically irrational trade laws upon which
the whole superstructure of trade remedies and agency practices have
been built. Antidumping laws, for instance, should be replaced with a
harmonized regime of predatory pricing laws. The quid pro quo for
fundamental reform would be stringent limits placed upon Canada's
ability to provide subsidies to domestic industries. This is made clear in
the Senate report on the implementation of NAFTA:
Section 406 [of the implementing legislation] sets forth the
negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to
subsidies, for any future trade negotiations with a NAFTA
country:
(1) achievement of increased discipline on domestic sub-
sidies provided by a foreign government, including the
provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms
inconsistent with commercial considerations; the provi-
sion of goods or services at preferential rates; the grant
of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry; and the assumption of
any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or
distribution;
(2) achievement of increased discipline on export subsi-
dies provided by a foreign government, particularly with
respect to agricultural products; and
(3) maintenance of effective remedies against subsi-
dized imports, including, where appropriate, countervail-
ing duties.
In the Committee's view, the more detailed negotiating objec-
tives spelled out in section 406 reflect the importance to both the
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U.S. Government and U.S. industries of achieving more effective
rules and disciplines concerning the use of government subsi-
dies. At the same time, they build upon the concerns set out in
section 409(a) of the CFTA Act with respect to obtaining greater
disciplines on Canadian subsidy programs that adversely affect
U.S. industries which directly compete with subsidized imports
.... The Committee anticipates close consultation with the
Administration with respect to any future subsidy negotiations
conducted pursuant to Article 1907.181
It is questionable whether Canada wants reform at the price of freedom
to use subsidies to address issues and values that are fundamental to
Canada. The Canadian government pursues many objectives that are
not necessarily rational from an economic standpoint. One example is
provided by the Canadian Internal Trade Agreement, signed onJuly 18,
1994, in which the importance of regional development is stressed and a
number of exceptions are built into the agreement to allow the federal
and provincial governments to pursue this goal.' 82 Of course, narrow
181. Senate NAFTA Report, supra note 59, at 39-40.
182. Agreement on Internal Trade (Canada), July 18, 1994 (on file with Law and Policy in
InternationalBusiness). The Agreement provides in article 101:
It is the objective of the Parties to reduce and eliminate, to the extent possible, barriers
to the free movement of goods, services, persons and investments within Canada and to
establish an open, efficient and stable domestic market. All Parties recognize and agree
that enhancing trade and mobility within Canada would contribute to the attainment of
this goal.
Id. art. 101. However, this objective is immediately qualified in article 102(4) with respect to
regional development: "In applying the principles set out in paragraph 3, Parties recognize: ... (c)
the need for exceptions required to meet regional development objectives in Canada .... Id. art.
102(4).
Article 1802 provides:
(1) The Parties recognize that measures adopted or maintained by the
Federal Government or any other Party which are part of a general framework
of regional economic development can play an important role in encouraging
long-term job creation, economic growth, industrial competitiveness or in
reducing economic disparities.
(2) Subject to paragraphs 3 through 7, the provisions of Part III [General
Rules] and Part IV tSpecific Rules on inter alia, procurement, investment,
labor mobility, environmental protection] of this Agreement do not apply to a
measure adopted or maintained by the Federal Government or any other
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exceptions have been provided in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies
allowing regional development programs, but a review of the Canadian
Internal Trade Agreement between the provinces and the federal
government indicates that Canada has an interest in regional develop-
ment subsidies that may go beyond the limits envisioned by the WTO.
As a result, Canada wants reform but may not be willing to pay the price
for it. Both Canada and the United States may have an interest in
maintaining the current system of trade laws because they are disguised
protectionist devices to preserve the status quo. The trade law regime
provides a safety valve in the United States to channel protectionist
sentiments in Congress in a manner permitting the signing of interna-
tional trade agreements. In Canada, the regime allows the government
to maintain its ability to use subsidies to pursue such goals as regional
development. Of course, there may come a time when Canada may be
willing to limit its ability to provide subsidies, if the current debt
problems evolve into a debt crisis such as that which Mexico faced in
1982 and which New Zealand weathered in the mid-1980s.
C. Options For The Settlement OfDisputes
Assuming that reform of the underlying trade law regimes beyond the
implementation of the WTO agreements will not occur, what are the
options? The first is to do nothing and leave the mechanism unchanged.
If that is the case, it appears quite certain that a tug of war will take
place with respect to the proper measure of deference to be accorded to
the administrative agencies. Nationality may play a role in this tug of
war in a manner that tends to bring the entire mechanism into disre-
pute. The importance of this concern will depend upon the degree
Party which are part of a general framework of regional economic develop-
ment provided that:
(a) the measure does not operate to impair unduly the access of
persons, goods, services or investments of another Party; and
(b) the measure is no more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve
its specific objective.
Id. art. 1802.
Both Canada and the United States have accepted significant new disciplines in the Uruguay
Round, especially with respect to domestic subsidies having an import displacement effect. Note
also that article 1809 of the Canadian Internal Trade Agreement provides: "Nothing in this
Agreement is intended to provide nor shall be construed to provide, directly or indirectly, to any
national, enterprise, state or other person any right, claim or remedy, other than those existing
immediately prior to the coming into force of this Agreement, under any international agreement."
Id. art. 1809(1).
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to which a trend does emerge that nationality is relevant to the
determination of disputes. Inconsistencies will likely arise between
binational panel determinations. The resolution of such inconsistencies
will depend upon whether the extraordinary challenge committees take
advantage of the window of opportunity created by Live Swine andJudge
Wilkey's views and become more interventionist. The next extraordi-
nary challenge committee, most likely to be determined under the
NAFTA provisions, will be an important litmus test as to the future of
the mechanism, particularly the role of nationality, if there is a U.S.
majority on the committee.
The second option is to eliminate the binational panel mechanism
entirely and return to the Court of International Trade and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The argument for the elimina-
tion of the mechanism is that it is of little use if the changes in NAFTA
and the utilization of Article III judges result in a degree of deference
that provides identical results to the Court of International Trade and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Canada may not
accept the elimination of the mechanism due to the success it has
enjoyed and the pressure it has placed upon the administrative agencies
to produce better-reasoned decisions. Canada may also oppose the
elimination of the mechanism even if it produces results identical to
those of the U.S. courts due to the timeliness of the system:
FTA dispute resolution is more than twice as fast as U.S. judicial
review. Whereas all but two FTA panels have met the FTA's
deadline of 315 days (about ten and a half months), judicial
review to the Court of International Trade ("CIT") typically takes
about 26 months. Even considering the delays in two FTA panels,
since some panels have made their decisions before the deadline, the
median time for a panel decision is ten and a half months ...
The FTA not only provides for quick panel decisions, it also
offers speedier remands than the CIT. The median length of
time for a first remand to a binational panel is a little over four
months compared to six months for a first CIT remand. For a
second remand, the median length of time for a binational panel
is two and a half months whereas a second remand to the CIT
takes five months.
[With respect to extraordinary challenges], [w]hile there has only
been one extraordinary challenge to date,183 the entire challenge
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process took only two and a half months.'84 By comparison, an appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit typically takes over
ten months.'
85
In the United States, there is apparently no limit on the number of
remands that can take place.' 86 The binational panels have given the
administrative agencies one remand 1 7 in which to review their decision
but, on a second remand, have virtually directed the administrative
agencies to a specific finding. However, the timeliness of the process
should not be overstated. Pursuant to the FTA, the complete dispute
settlement system is 795 days (390 for U.S. domestic process plus 405
days for the binational process with a second remand and ECC re-
view). '"8 8 This is also the case with respect to the annual reviews. Softwood
184. The maximum is now ninety days under NAFTA Annex 1904.13(2) instead of thirty days
under FTA Annex 1904.13(2). NAFTA, supra note 18, Annex 1904.13(2), at 688; FTA, supra note 1,
Annex 1904.13(2), at 395.
185. G.N. Horlick & F.A. DeBusk, The Functioning ofFTA Dispute Resolution Panels, in NEGOTIAT-
ING AND IMPLEMENTING A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1, 9 (L. Waverman ed., 1992).
186. See, e.g., Porkfrom Canada:
Though commentators regularly express the view that the Chapter 19 Pane Review of
the FTA was meant to replace the judicial review (in the United States) of the Court of
International Trade ("CIT"), a Panel is clearly not on the same footing as the CIT, which
is not constrained to issue a "final decision" on a second review. Indeed, in the case of
Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984), there were several
successive remands.
In reFresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, No. USA-89-1904-11, 1991 FTAPD LEXIS 1, *6
(Binational Review) (Jan. 22, 1991).
187. The powers of binational panels are limited to remands that require the domestic
agencies to review and/or change their decision:
The panel may uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent
with the panel's decision. Where the panel remands a final determination, the panel shall
establish as brief a time as is reasonable for compliance with the remand .... In no event
shall the time permitted for compliance with a remand exceed an amount of time equal
to the maximum amount of time (counted from the date of the filing of a petition,
complaint or application) permitted by statute for final determination in an investiga-
tion. If review of the action taken by the competent investigating authority on remand is
needed, such review shall be before the same panel, which shall issue a final decision
within 90 days of the date on which such remand action is submitted to it.
FTA, supra note I, art. 1904(8), at 388-89.
188. The 315 day time limit is for the rendering of an initial panel decision and does not
include the time limit required for a remand or the extraordinary challenge committee procedure.
The process is extended by 90 days for a remand and an additional 75-90 days for the extraordinary
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Lumber III took just under three years (October 4, 1991, through August
4, 1994). In Live Swine, it took more than three and one-half years to
complete the fourth administrative review of the original countervailing
duty order of August 15, 1985. But timeliness and finality are not sufficient
reasons to preserve a separate NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism. U.S.
trade representatives may be willing to impose similar restrictions upon the
Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals if the
NAFTA mechanism were eliminated. This action is, however, unlikely.
Of course, if Chapter 19 procedures were eliminated, it would still be
possible for any party to NAFTA, as a member of the WTO, to resort to
the Dispute Settlement Body, if the legislature,judiciary, or administra-
tive bodies of another party took measures not in conformity with
obligations assumed under relevant WTO covered agreements, thereby
impairing or nullifying any benefit accruing directly or indirectly to the
complaining member under such agreements.
A third option is to broaden the powers of the extraordinary challenge
committee to make it a regular appellate tribunal. The ECC cannot act
as a proper check on the binational panels under the standard of review
emerging from the first two ECC determinations and from the majority
of the Softwood Lumber III ECC. There is a risk of inconsistency between
panel determinations to a degree that is unacceptable in an area of the
law where it can be expected that the same dispute will emerge once
again in a new iteration, covering a different trade period or a different
product. Unfortunately, Softwood Lumber III suggests strongly that the
composition of the panels has the potential to promote inconsistent
findings between iterations even within the same dispute. Primafacie, the
extraordinary challenge committee should have powers of review that
will promote consistency between panels in order to eliminate factors
such as nationality from the dispute settlement process.
A fourth option is to leave the binational panel mechanism as it is but
require that only judges shall be chosen as panelists, the assumption
being that judges would better apply the principles of judicial review of
agency action than ad hoc panelists who are experts in international
trade. Presumably, judges would be chosen who have experience in
judicial review of final determinations in antidumping and countervail-
ing duty determinations. The NAFTA has already introduced this
concept by requiring that the "roster shall include judges or former
judges to the fullest extent practicable"' 89 and that "[a] majority of the
challenge committee procedure. The U.S. system is designed to be a maximum 390 days, but this is
regularly extended through remands.
189. NAFTA, supra note 18, Annex 1901.2(1), at 687.
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panelists on each panel shall be lawyers in good standing."' 90 The
United States has provided in its implementing legislation that the
USTR is required to appoint judges and former judges to serve on both
panels and committees, although it remains to be seen whether judges
will be included on the U.S. roster.' 9' Canada may become increasingly
receptive to the appointment of judges to the panel. There may be a
trend emerging whereby the composition of panels is changing from the
inclusion of practitioners to non-lawyers and academics. It has been
argued that Softwood Lumber III will accelerate this trend because of the
allegations of bias that were brought against the two Canadian panelists
before the extraordinary challenge committee. It was stated that "Soft-
wood Lumber III would send a chill up my spine particularly if I was in a
large firm."' 192 An amendment to the NAFTA would be required for
rosters to be composed entirely of judges or retired judges. This option
represents an acceptance that the mechanism should be an exact
substitute for the domestic appellate process.
A fifth and more radical option is to allow administrative agencies to
continue investigating complaints and making preliminary determina-
tions. The agencies would then act as advocates, along with the domestic
industries, before binational or trinational panels that would make the
final determination. The final determination would then be subject to
the appellate review channels of the nation in respect of which the
determination was made. This would address many of the concerns
expressed in Judge Wilkey's dissent, both practically and constitution-
ally. The agencies would continue to play an important role in the entire
process and give the immediate relief and protection that preliminary
duties entail. The panels would be able to perform the function for
which they are truly suited: using their trade expertise to determine the
dispute. The safeguard protecting the U.S. position would be that their
own appellate channels, the U.S. Court of International Trade and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, would review the bina-
tional panel determination as they would any other antidumping or
countervailing duty determination. No constitutional issues would then
arise, and there would also be no problem of conflicting panel determina-
tions.
190. Id. Annex 1901.2(2), at 687.
191. Senate NAFTA Report, supra note 59, at 35-36. ECC members must be judges or former
judges. NAFTA, supra note 18, Annex 1904.13(1), at 688.
192. Statement of Michael Flavelle, Flavelle Kubrick & Lalonde, Ottawa, Trade War and
Peace: Panels and Committees under the FTA and NAFTA, Meeting of the Canadian Bar
Association of Ontario (Oct. 19, 1994). The Canadian government has not found it difficult to find
practitioners to staff panels.
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Judge Wilkey may not be impressed by this solution. His Honor would
comment that the problem is rooted in the difficulty that foreign
panelists have in divorcing themselves from their legal training and
experience in order to apply U.S. trade law principles correctly. If they
do not understand the principles ofjudicial review, how are they going to
understand the principles of U.S. trade law and administrative prac-
tices? The answer would apparently lie in the fact that they are trade law
experts. HoweverJudge Wilkey indicated that Commerce is the master
of antidumping and countervailing duty policy and would argue further
that Commerce has the benefit of continuity that is lost when resort is
made to an ad hoc panel that may take time to be appointed and become
familiar with the case.
A sixth option would be to replace the ad hoc binational panel system
and ECC with a permanent international trade review tribunal com-
prised of three nationals of each NAFTA country and a presiding
member who is not a NAFTA national, all appointed for a lengthy period
or permanently. The decisions of the tribunal would be final and binding
on the parties involved and, where necessary, would be enforceable
directly by registration in the court of competent jurisdiction of the
non-complying NAFTA party instead of resorting to compensation and
suspension of benefits or terminating the agreement. The members of
the tribunal could be trained in the various national standards ofjudicial
review through special educational programs at major law schools of the
parties. Exchange programs could be arranged with the different admin-
istrative agencies to enable the appointees to spend a period of time
with each to gain a better appreciation of the manner in which they
carry out their investigations. The introduction of a permanent review
tribunal should solve the problem of consistency and permit the United
States to appoint active or retired Article III judges to the court. A
process of review involving a single stage would address Canada's
concern for an expedited process if the NAFTA time limits were imposed
upon such tribunal. Instead of applying existing national standards ofjudicial
review of administrative action, the tribunal could be given the power to
review final determinations in an unrestricted manner or in accordance
with a uniform broad and intrusive standard ofjudicial review.
Finally, another option would be to submit final determinations to
binding arbitration, with the decisions being enforceable in the national
courts.
VIII. LESSONS FROM WTO 1994
The dispute settlement mechanism that has emerged from the GATT
1994 Agreements provides some important lessons for the reform of the
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NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism. Firstly, the antidumping dis-
pute settlement mechanism indicates that the United States will strongly
resist any curb placed upon the powers of the Department of Commerce
or the International Trade Commission. This is evident by the United
States' insistence to include the following provisions:
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was
proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the
evaluation shall not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant
provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to
be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations. 193
In the first sub-paragraph, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) panel is
required to defer to the determination and evaluation of facts by the
Department of Commerce and the International Trade Agency (in the
United States) as long as the process was unbiased and objective. The
DSB panel is not permitted to substitute its establishment and evalua-
tion of the facts, even if it would have reached a different conclusion.
The second subparagraph requires that the DSB panel defer to the
administrative agencies in circumstances where an interpretation of the
consistency of the implementing legislation with the GATT 1994 Agree-
ments, or an interpretation of a WTO question, has been brought into
question. Where a panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agree-
ment is, in its eyes, capable of more than one "permissible" (that is,
"reasonable") interpretation, then the panel is required to defer to the
administrative agencies.194
Once again, the DSB panel cannot substitute its preferred permis-
sible alternative determination. These provisions require significant
deference to the administrative agencies, and they are reminiscent of
the constraints placed upon the binational panels by the standard of
193. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, art. 17(6), reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 19, at 168, 193.
194. Id. art. 17(6)(ii), at 193.
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judicial review established by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC' 95 and its
progeny.
The inclusion of these provisions, which are limited to matters arising
under the Antidumping Code, is unfortunate. They were part of a set of
proposals, all of which were extremely protectionist, made by the U.S.
government in November 1993 before the GATT 1994 Agreements were
approved on December 15, 1993.196 DSB panels should be free to
interpret WTO law and determine whether national law is consistent
with WTO principles. Now, it is quite conceivable that the DSB panels
may be required to endorse two conflicting national interpretations of
the same WTO principle, if both interpretations are permissible. Article
17.6 reduces the role and function of the DSB panels to that of judicial
review. Professor Robert Hudec has confirmed the importance of a
standard of review in defending the arbitrary rules of thumb which are
enshrined in the antidumping law:
The most plausible reason for a higher-than-average rate of
GATT violations in AD/CVD cases is that AD/CVD decisions
contain so many opportunities for findings of "error." The legal
basis of an AD/CVD proceeding is a meticulous examination of
price/cost information or government benefits to determine if
there has been any "abnormal" business or government con-
duct. Analysis of "material injury" involves a myriad of similar
choices about the relevant industry, market, time period, data
and so forth. Each case involves hundreds of these issues. When
AD/CVD measures are imposed in a judicialized procedural
setting, the answers to all these questions are highly transpar-
ent. Given the arbitrary nature of AD/CVD standards and
concepts to begin with, there is always something to disagree
with in the way that any answer has been derived. This is
particularly so where administrators adopt rules-of-thumb to
keep from being submerged in detail. Rules of thumb usually err on
the side of being too restrictive, and without a standard of review explicitly
protecting such rules of thumb, they are particularly dijficult to defend
internationally. Needless to say, the fact that AD/CVD complaints
tend to experience a high rate of adverse legal rulings creates a
195. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
196. See Negotiators Down in the Dumps Over U.S. Draft: Washington Set to Take on the World in Clash
Over Anti-Dumping Proposals, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1993, at 6.
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high probability of legal failure, given the limited ability to
revise AD/CVD actions once taken.'
97
The introduction of a limited deference by the DSB panels to national
administrative agencies gives the rules of thumb a much greater chance
of being defended internationally.
Secondly, the appellate procedure introduced by the WTO' 98 is much
broader than the extraordinary challenge committee procedure. The
WTO mechanism includes a standing appellate body composed of seven
members serving a four year term with each appeal being heard by three
members serving in rotation.' 99 The grounds of appeal are set out as
follows:
An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel
report and legal interpretation developed by the panel.
20 0
The WTO standard is appellate and approximates that used in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, whereby errors of law are
reviewable. This difference between the ECC and WTO process of
review is important when evaluating Judge Wilkey's dissent in the
Softwood Lumber III ECC. The appellate standard in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding is much broader than the current, narrowly
defined standard for the ECCs. It seems illogical that the WTO stan-
dard will ensure greater consistency of interpretation than the NAFTA
standard. Nevertheless, the creation by the United States of the World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Review Commission indicates
that Judge Wilkey's concerns are being taken seriously by the Ameri-
cans. This Commission, which is comprised of five federal appellate
judges, must review panel or appellate body reports adopted by the
197. Robert E. Hudec, et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE, 1,88-89 (1993) (emphasis added).
198. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 17,
reprinted in RESULTS OF THE URUGAY ROUND, supra note 19, at 404, 417 [hereinafter Dispute
Settlement Understanding].
199. Id. art. 17(2), at 417-18.
200. Id. art. 17(6), at 418. Appellate review was demanded by the United States as the price for
accepting the automatic adoption of panel reports. It has been argued that since both NAFTA and
GATT panel rulings are binding only on the parties to the case and only in respect of the particular
matter before the panel, neither the ECC nor the Appellate Body were designed to ensure absolute
consistency in jurisprudence. We do not accept this argument. The Appellate Body will strive for
consistency when interpreting GAIT principles and obligations.
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Dispute Settlement Body to determine if rulings adverse to the United
States have exceeded the panel's authority, added to U.S. obligations or
diminished its rights, acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in mis-
conduct, or demonstrably departed from applicable procedures. It must
also determine whether such action has materially affected the outcome
of the dispute. Following a positive finding by the Commission, any
member of Congress can introduce a resolution calling for the President
of the United States to negotiate a solution in the WTO. After three
positive determinations by the Commission in any five year period, any
member of Congress can introduce a resolution of "disapproval" of U.S.
participation in the WTO. If enacted by Congress and signed by the
President, the United States would commence to withdraw from the
WTO. This peculiar system of domestic judicial review would have a
chilling effect upon the actions of the Dispute Settlement Body of the
WTO in cases where the United States is involved.20 ' Nevertheless, the
system has been deemed to be politically expedient as a safety valve
against possible improprieties by WTO dispute settlement bodies.
IX. CONCLUSION
The most effective reform of the NAFTA binational dispute settle-
ment mechanism would probably be to create a permanent NAFTA
international trade review tribunal. This proposal addresses most of the
concerns expressed by Judge Wilkey as well as Canada's desire to
maintain the more positive aspects of the present mechanism. However,
if the creation of such a tribunal were not possible, Canada should not
resist the possible evolution of the extraordinary challenge committee
into a second tier of review more closely resembling a regular appellate
system of review. It seems inconsistent to have such a second tier of
review in the WTO process but not in NAFTA.2 °2
It is unlikely that any more substantial reform is possible at the
present time. The environment created in the United States by the
perceived failure of panels and committees to apply the correct standard
of review and the allegations of national bias are such that it will be
difficult to discuss reform in any meaningful way.
201. Of course, any WTO member can withdraw from the Agreement on six months notice.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XV(I), reprinted in RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 19, at 6, 17.
202. This has been rejected in some quarters on the ground that the FTA/NAFTA panels were
designed to provide expeditious and final review as a replacement for judicial review by domestic
courts where conflicting court decisions and divergent jurisprudence are not unknown and,
therefore, no interest would be served in turning the ECC into an appellate body.
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Negotiation of fundamental changes to the trade law regime must
take place at the time major trade agreements are under consideration,
when they can be combined with numerous other issues providing a
balance of advantages and disadvantages that have a chance to pass
through Congress as a package. Any limit that is sought to be placed
upon U.S. administrative tribunals will generally be perceived as nega-
tive and unfair and create significant political opposition in Washington.
As a result, fundamental reform of the dispute settlement system has a
very limited chance of succeeding on its own.
The environment for change will not improve until the United States
becomes deeply concerned with the manner in which its exports are
being targeted by other nations, especially developing nations, as it has
fostered a trade law system that pays significant dividends to countries
that adopt a similar system and enthusiastically engage in its use.
It must be kept in mind that procedures for the settlement of trade
disputes are intimately connected with the applicable substantive law
and that Chapter 19 was included in the FTA/NAFTA because the
parties could not come to an agreement on a substitute system of rules
for dealing with unfair pricing and government subsidization. Since
cross-border dumping of goods can have no place in the NAFTA internal
market governed by the free movement of goods, the existing national
antidumping laws should cease to apply to NAFTA countries at the end
of the maximum transitional period of fifteen years.20 3 With respect to
subsidies, the adoption of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures by NAFTA members 0 4 should overcome past
difficulties as it meets their concerns, especially those of the United
States. There is really no need for different rules on subsidies and
countervailing measures applicable to NAFTA members inter se. Consid-
ering that the new most elaborate and effective system of dispute
settlement contained in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
applicable to the antidumping and subsidies codes offers more guaran-
tees of due process than the FTA/NAFTA procedures, there is little
justification for relying exclusively on the remedies provided by Chapter
19, especially in light of the criticism of the panel system highlighted in
the Softwood Lumber III case. Once the WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and the Dispute Settlement Understanding are in place, NAFTA mem-
203. Dumping should be subject to the national competition laws. In the European Union, see
the original section of Article 91(2) of the Treaty of Rome, concerning the "boomerang effect."
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 91(2), 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 50-51.
204. In Canada, see House of Commons of Canada, Bill C-57. In the United States, see
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Dec. 8, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809.
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bers could easily eliminate Chapter 19 and revert to the pre-FTA system
of settlement of trade disputes and, when necessary, the WTO proce-
dures, at least until a NAFTA international trade review tribunal can be
created.2 °5 The quid pro quo for the elimination of the Chapter 19
mechanism would be: (1) that the WTO determinations in antidumping
and countervailing duty disputes between NAFTA members would be
binding and enforceable on them; and (2) that the preliminary and final
determinations of administrative tribunals could be immediately adjudi-
cated by WTO panels without waiting for U.S. appellate channels to be
exhausted. Perhaps on the accession of Chile to the NAFTA, the parties
will seriously consider this practical, logical, and painless solution,
especially now that the United States can rely on the WTO Dispute
Settlement Review Commission as the ultimate guardian of domestic
trade law purity and integrity.
205. Judge Wilkey is in agreement with the proposition that Chapter 19 could be eliminated
and that the WTO procedures could be used in NAFTA antidumping and countervailing duty
disputes. OnJune 21, 1995, he appeared before the Congressional Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Trade, which was conducting hearings relating to the accession of Chile to
NAFTA. The conclusion tojudge Wilkey's written submissions was as follows:
To conclude: Chapter 19 of FTA/NAFTA as a dispute settlement mechanism has
demonstrably failed; with hindsight we can see that failure was built in. Redesigning a
new process that will not only work between the United States and Canada but also take
into consideration the traditions and jurisprudence of Mexico and Chile is a daunting
task. The new GATT/WTO has a well thought out Dispute Settlement Understanding to
which all four countries have already agreed, and to which the United States contributed
much in the negotiation. In substantive issues covered it would fit NAFTA. The Chapter
19 process has been made redundant; AD/CVD disputes among the NAFTA signatories
may be decided by invoking the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. Why not
utilize the machinery already constructed?
I assume that particular decision is not within the scope of the Committee's task at the
moment. In line with its assigned task, I respectfully recommend: (1) that the Fast Track
authority for negotiation with Chile be granted without the dispute settlement of Chapter 19
or any other mechanism included; (2) that hearings be conducted by the appropriate commit-
tees to consider making the DSU (Dispute Settlement Understanding) of GATT/WTO a part
of NAFTA; (3) that in the meantime no further proceedings under Chapter 19 be undertaken
by the Executive; (4) that the hearings under (2) be designed to produce a replacement for
Chapter 19 which could then be negotiated with Canada, Mexico and Chile. There is no reason
to delay the basic negotiations between the three NAFTA partners and Chile while we work out
what we desire as a dispute settlement mechanism.
Written Testimony of Malcolm R. Wilkey, Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 7-8,June 21, 1995 (on file with Law and Policy in
International Business).
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